Worker Compensation Guidelines [Revised]

Over the last month, I’ve been working on updating the Worker Compensation Guidelines. This has been discussed on the last few Governance calls and I’ve also received feedback from several individual contributors. I want to present the current draft, seek community feedback and move forward with an on-chain proposal.

A couple things to flag:

  • Base salary in ETH/Dai + DXD compensation (priced at the bonding curve)
  • Self-identify experience level to determine compensation amount
  • Trial/Ramp up period - 1st month - 70%, 2nd - 80%, 3rd - 90; full comp on month 4
  • DXD vesting - currently 1 year

Check out the full document for more:

I did want to gauge the community’s thoughts on two areas, trial ramp up period & vesting schedule.

Trial ramp up period:

  • 3 month trial period (Month 1 = 70% of compensation, Month 2 = 80%, Month 3 = 90%)
  • 2 month trial period (Month 1 = 75%, Month 2 = 90%)
  • No trial period

0 voters

Vesting schedule:

  • 1 year DXD vesting
  • 2 year DXD vesting

0 voters

Please check out the full doc, vote in the polls and provide any feedback below. We will be discussing on tomorrow’s Governance discussion.

I’d like to point that bounties can serve as a strong indicator of a person’s dedication and potential. There are people in the running for paid engagement that have made a lot of important contributions and don’t need 3 more months of proving themselves imo.

4 Likes

Maybe the time from when someone started a bounty could count as their “start date” towards the ramp up period.

I view a one year vesting schedule as extremely weak from an incentive alignment perspective. For all the people voting for 1 year vesting, what’s the rationale?

I guess depends on the type of work, I assume entire point of vesting is so that the worker is financially incentive to not harm dxdao, and only to help, since dxd’s success is tied to dxdao, so I think a year is enough for a lot of types of positions, however if its something more critical role, i think longer vesting is optimal.

Well, there seems to be consensus on the trial period (2 months), but the 1 & 2 year vesting poll is very close (53% for 1 year right now).

I did not specific a length of time for the poll initially. It was posted on Tuesday night US east coast time and I feel that 3 days is an adequate time to allow for voting.

Given the divide on 1/2 year vesting, would it make sense to just split the difference and go with an 18 month vesting period?

Besides the two polls, are there any other comments or suggestions on the Worker Compensation Guidelines?

I’d like to move forward with a proposal for REP holders to approve soon.

2 Likes

I’d say splitting the difference with 18 months is a good call.

2 Likes

what about 50% after 1 year and 50% after 2 years? - that’s simple

Like I mentioned on the call, all workers should vote 1 year (concerning their personal interests).

However, we NEED to better align REP and DXD holders, and one powerful, easy way to do that is through vesting DXD.

In that context, 1 yr is probably too short.

We want DXD holders to be like “oh, DXD vesting for two years - that’s awesome!” I’m onboard

so maybe that is 50% 1yr and 50% 2yr

or even 50% 1yr, 25% 2 yr, and 25% 3yr!

Yeah - the 50% at year 1 and 50% at year 2 seems better for both. The ability to unlock some liquidity (when DXD is accepted as collateral), but keep incentives aligned longer.

Why don’t you just borrow from DXlend against your locked up DXD???

1 Like

Two things:

  • The vesting can have a start date, lets say the vesting is for 18 months it can have a start date plus 6 months, which means that the tokens would start to be released 6 months after created for the next 12 months.
  • The vesting can be cancelled by someone, do we want the vesting to be able to be cancelled by the dxdao? What would make the dxdao being able to cancel a vesting?
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Because DXdao has the decision to implement vesting, it makes sense to give DXdao the power to remove vesting. There could be some reason in the future, and would be better for DXdao to own that option, even if unlikely.
DXdao can always change the terms (going forward) by using a new vesting contract, but this is regarding tokens locked in this contract.

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Hi all,
I plan to submit a formal proposal with the Worker Compensation Guidelines 2.3, which I’ve PDF’d and uploaded to IPFS.
I added these text changes based on the polls and subsequent discussion:

  • Trial Period - Adjusted to “During Month 1, 75% of normal compensation is paid; Month 2, 90% of normal compensation; and Month 3 (and thereafter), 100% of normal compensation. Bounties and other contributions may count towards a workers’ trial period.”
  • DXD Vesting - Adjusted to “DXD compensation on top of base salary. This is locked up with 50% vesting after 1 year and 50% vesting after 2 years.”

Let me know if there are any last minute additions.

Assuming these guidelines pass, there is still be work to be done on the logistics of vesting, particularly because there is no vesting contract solution for non-technical workers yet. Any vesting implementation should fall within these guidelines, but it should not be defined by them.

It is difficult to plan for unforeseen events, like DXdao cancelling vesting or bounties evolving into the easiest onboarding mechanism, so it’s important to craft guidelines that can be flexible but also clear and fair.

2 Likes

Hi all,

An update. There are no existing, audited smart contracts to fulfill the “50% at year 1 and 50% at year 2” text outlined in the Guidelines 2.3 Draft.

The most widely used (and secure) vesting contracts right now are continuous vesting contracts. This means that tokens are unlocked at a constant rate until the end vesting date. Curve has deployed a similar system for distributing CRV tokens to pre-launch LPs.

As discussed with others in Keybase, I think the continuous vesting contract can be used as the compromise to the year 1/ year 2 vesting discussion above, because it unlocks some liquidity for workers while keeping their incentives aligned. And it will be less resource-intensive on DXdao and lower gas costs for DXdao contributors.

Furthermore, I think a 1 year vesting cliff would provide a more fair distribution and align interests between DXD and REP holders. This means that the tokens would ‘accrue’ after one year and then continuously unlocked until the end of year 2.

So, I’m proposing an additional edit to the Worker Compensation Guidelines to replace the previous vesting text with the following, “DXD compensation on top of base salary. This is vested continuously for two years with a one year cliff.”

I’ve made the changes and uploaded Worker Compensation Guidelines 2.4 to IPFS.

Let me know of any suggestions before I submit the proposal.

5 Likes