This is part of the Genesis Protocol V0.2 research umbrella.
The specific topic is predictor’s bias towards success of proposals.
Here is the currently implemented protocol.
There was a bunch of discussion in the comments of the google doc on this one, and I thought it might be helpful to try organizing it a bit here.
Anyone can boost a proposal by putting sufficient upstake all at once and leave no downstake whatsoever, and thus no skin in the game to call for “negative voters.”
Attempting to put it another way: Starting with a brand new proposal with 0 staked GEN on it, we can see from the protocol that there is an incentive to place upstake (stake that a proposal will pass) – you will receive a share of B1, the DAO bounty for stakers, if the proposal passes, even if no one else stakes – but there is no incentive to place downstake until after someone has upstaked – downstaker rewards draw only from failed upstake.
It’s also fairly affordable to pay for the entire upstake necessary to boost a proposal all at once, or at least very quickly. When that happens, no one has a chance to place downstake on it, since boosted proposals cannot be staked on.
Since new proposals only incentivize upstake, and then that upstake boosts the proposal quickly, there is often never an incentive nor much of a chance to downstake on a proposal. That’s a problem because it’s probably not very collectively intelligent: instead of taking advantage of the wisdom of crowds, it’s often just the “wisdom” of the lucky person who gets to stake first.
Community Suggestions So Far
An idea from Daniel Shavit: change the boosting threshold to require not only a certain score based on stake (upstake - downstake), but also a minimum number of staking addresses. If the problem is mostly that a single person is taking the proposal from 0 to boosted too quickly, we could require stakes from multiple addresses to slow this down. The minimum number of addresses might depend on the DAO’s activity level (ahem measure of collective attention supply) and on the current number of boosted proposals (as the current threshold does). One issue with this is that it’s fairly easy for one person to stake from multiple addresses, since staking doesn’t require Reputation.
- Another option here: create rules for maximum positive stake sizes that prevent one address from boosting a proposal from 0 in one stake. (maximum size of stake n = stakeNeededToBoost / someConstant^n, something like that?). Has similar issues to the above idea, though.
Idea from Matan’s doc: Put unboosted proposals into two categories: upstake-only, and downstake-allowed. At first, proposals would only allow upstake. Once their score passes the boosting threshold, though, instead of boosting right away, we delay boosting for a certain period and allow both upstaking and downstaking in that period. This guarantees that there is some chance to downstake on every proposal.
- Daniel brought up the question of what happens to the proposal if its score goes below the boosting threshold during the downstake-allowed phase: does it still get boosted after time is up? Does it go back to upstake-only? Does it stay in the downstake-allowed phase until it either times out or has a score of the boosting threshold for a minimum amount of time?
- Pat built on Daniel’s point by suggesting that enough downstake could “unboost” a proposal and return it to the regular cue (not sure how exactly this suggestions interacts with Matan’s, perhaps Pat can clarify)
- Here’s another version: instead of upstake-only, downstake-allowed, and boosted (no staking) proposals, we keep the current two categories (unboosted and unboosted), but we change the rules a bit. For the first x hours a proposal is boosted, you can still upstake and downstake on it. If its score goes below threshold in that time, it gets unboosted. If its score goes back above threshold, it gets boosted again, and the x hours (along with the voting time limit) get reset.
Idea from the related downstake before upstake discussion: Pay a small DAO bounty to downstakers (smaller than the current rather large one for upstakers), and prevent a spam proposal-creation-and-downstake attack (farming the DAO bounty) by offsetting the downstake bounty with a modest proposal submission fee.