Proposal: Let's not get #rekt - Workshop + documentation-driven Study Group

I am actually glad this happened, because the concept of riders is something that will naturally be pursued in different contexts of proposal creation. I’m not sure how you stop it from happening.

If you prevent the technical functionality for riders to exist, they will eventually just become embedded within the complexity of the proposal, with or without the communities consent.

If you enable the technical functionality for riders to exist, you allow for leverage to be created on behalf of the service being provided through such a proposal.

While this proposal isn’t the supreme exemplar, we can imagine that the concept of riders being utilized as a tool to leverage fraudulent (compromising) ends could become problematic (beneficial), especially in an environment of limited (competitive) service options.

I’d like to know everyone’s thoughts on this subject.

Hi @natesuits, could you clarify what you are referring to wrt the “concept of riders”? I can’t figure out how it relates to the staking vs voting issue, I’m surely missing something. Thank you!

1 Like

Yeah, I forgot about that… :man_facepalming:t2:
But yes, my concern was precisely the one you describe, the “permanent stonewalling”. I wasn’t aware that it’s been dubbed “the Joe Lubin attack”! Why’s that?
I just read Ezra’s post and his solutions make sense to me, especially the continuous boosting proposal.

Has there been any conversation within Genesis with respect to the parameters of non-boosted proposals? Would it make sense to assess the average and max of voters’ turnout, as well as the percentage of “dead” accounts, and take that into account to set a new threshold for passing a non-boosted proposal? Shouldn’t it be seen as aberration that not a single non-boosted proposal has ever passed?

1 Like

Because he’s a big fat whale :whale:

I don’t have a clear answer for you, but there’s a discussion here about it.


Hey! Apologies,

The concept of riders is not directly related to the staking vs. voting issue because I don’t think it should be evaluated from the perspective of whether such a proposal could pass/time out, but rather evaluating it through the dynamics of how the proposal was communicated.

It was a comment on the original proposal utilizing a rider clause that allowed for the consideration of a condition to the service being provided; essentially holding the thing that the community wants — hostage to fulfilling a condition they do not want.

This power dynamic has the potential to exist when there is a limited amount of human capital available to provide whatever services a DAO may desire.

Regardless of whether or not the service providers’ ‘work’ is digitally native or not, the concept of riders has always been a tool for leveraging power within human communication.

In highly competitive environments, these riders are used as a method to balance highly contentious core issues that have the community split into a binary path through increased ideological centralization of the community members. (This subject is directly related to the Values-Based DAO’s discussion.)

The use of a rider clause in this case, becomes a negotiation tool that ensures one path doesn’t dominate another — preventing quick movements away from the declared, and always subjective core-values.

The intention of my initial comments were to explore this concept from the capabilities of a DAO.

The questions I have on this subject are:

1.) Regardless of current technological capabilities, does anyone else foresee the use of riders becoming a norm within DAO Governance?

2.) If we begin to see the capability for proposals to be public and edited before they are officially submitted, do you foresee organizations with combative core issues favor an approach that results in very large complicated proposals, containing many riders (similar to State legislation) via negotiation/collaboration, rather than individual proposals that incrementally kick the can down one path or another?

3.) Is there a way to prevent riders? If there is, would there be a benefit to preventing them?

4.) If not, how can we accommodate the use of riders through features in Alchemy, that enable responsible and transparent practices? Do we even need to?

I’m currently stuck on this exploration and just wanted to know whether this is a non-issue from the perspective of others, or if it is worth exploring more.

It was a comment on the original proposal utilizing a rider clause that allowed for the consideration of a condition to the service being provided; essentially holding the thing that the community wants — hostage to fulfilling a condition they do not want.

You know, I could say that this analysis is wrong or that it feels quite disrespectful and all that.
But really… I see your concern, it is relevant, your analysis is super valuable, but the model which this looks like coming from is neither appropriate nor effective here.

Really, there are no malicious actors here. Hear me out when I tell you, we proposers are not attempting kidnapping a valuable proposal in exchange for undesired demands. Listen to the other +13 ppl that agree and support this proposal. This is not contemptuous, this is not an attack.

  1. One thing is asking for future consideration, a whole other is kidnapping or hijacking. The current proposal is independent from the extra funds request. Our combined work, in the root cause of a collective bottleneck, is one thing; and the call for help, as extra funds request for falling into the bottleneck’s trap, is another.

  2. And their relationship is straightforward: working for collective solutions to problems that stuck her individually makes her (future) request more meaningful, better backed and maybe even more deserving.
    I strongly believe that the rider mentality here is misplaced, same with the perception of shady clauses.

  3. I’m sorry, but how can you be so sure this is something the DAO doesn’t want? Or, even if true, again: enriching the context of the request (from a “mere” call for help to something backed by meaningful, useful work) is NOT an attack against the DAO. It’s the opposite, an honest effort to build an acceptable collective agreement around the issue. But I guess this is something we will only be sure after the request’s voting results.

I’d like to invite you and the people who stood against the proposal for similar reasons to consider different models. I really do. Maybe we should have a breakoutroom about Proposal Valuation Models or something. Let’s brainstorm that together!

The power for creative mending of fissures in the DAO consensus is so precious, byzantine fault tolerance for organizations at scale is something to be deeply and joyfully experimented with. Not condemned, quarantined nor stone walled.

We are all in this together. ::]

1 Like

I don’t have a clear answer for you, but there’s a discussion here about it.

Thanks @papa_raw! Just read it, it’s awesome. I’ll comment there so that we stay on-topic here.

1 Like

Even if the “Joe Lubin Attack” works X / Y times, Y - X / Y times Joe will get beaten out by an absolute majority, and GEN will redistribute from manipulators to honest predictors. An “in the long run” argument that I like, but some will say “In the long run we are all dead”.

But wait, to clarify, under a “Joe Lubin Attack”, if an absolute majority votes YES, will Joe Lubin’s GEN be redistributed to the GEN upstakers of the proposal?

By “greater majority” you mean “absolute majority”?

If I interpret “greater majority” as “absolute majority”, it seems that this will never happen, as there’s no incentive for an absolute majority to burn gas downvoting a proposal that would otherwise time out and go away.

Yes, this is correct.

1 Like