- I’m sure Martin has some more answers, but there are at least 2 ways (that we’re already familiar with) that DAOs could use PM:
a) Futarchy governance mechanism - for an intro see: https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/08/21/introduction-futarchy/
b) we can use prediction market (such as Gnosis) rather than prediction game (such as the one used right now in Alchemy) for Holographic Consensus, used for DAO governance. We’re actually looking at this possibility right now and analyzing the differences, pros and cons.
–> Martin (but a simple answer is buried in the Magnolia and fee-reduction structures, which essentially designed to attract exactly those liquidity providers).
There are no global constraints implemented for dxDAO at the starting point, but the DAO itself could be adding them. Re REP oligarchy, it’s not possible to have such constraint effectively, unless you’re also demanding for identity verification — one can easily open 1000 addresses and manage them by a single person without anyone knowing that. It’s interesting to think of other measures against reputation oligarchy.
Well, it’s a surprise… But really, a few examples could be:
a) The DAO deciding to change the trading fee structure and take a cut to itself, and then manage that fund for further (decentralized) development of the platform, spend on legal work or marketing.
b) The DAO decides to “tweet” (actually, “peep” http://www.peepeth.io/) and generate the first decentralized marketing/messaging organization in order to attract more users and traders.
c) The DAO can decide to make business offers to other DEXs, essentially looking for decentralized M&As
I’m sure there are many others… I may come back to this post later. Great stuff!