When developing a DAO, how do development teams defend against a nefarious individual or small group gaining > 50% of the voting power. I would like to hear your thoughts on the following points (especially 4.):
1. Create a small team that has the final say on whether any proposal should pass
The big problem here is obviously that you’re giving a small group of people a lot of power. In this situation, how big should such a team be and how should the members be chosen? I came across someone who said a DAO could be used solely for picking the team members and then a DAC structure can be used to handle the allocation of funds.
2. Create a small team of curators that verify wallets
If I understand correctly this was the approach done by TheDAO, but I don’t really get how they did this. Couldn’t an individual just make a bunch of wallets and funnel the money to all these different wallets and use these to cast votes. Did these curators have tools that auto checked the wallet’s history and flag ones for review that had a history with a suspicious wallet. Any information on this would be highly appreciated.
3. Put a cap on the amount of voting power a single wallet can have
This would not provide a defence against people making bulk wallets, but it would definitely make it harder to hijack the voting.
4. Create a small team that can only deny proposals (but not accept them)
In this case the DAO could be run entirely by the community and there would be a much reduced risk of the core team exit scamming (unless the majority of the team colludes with the majority holders). If someone obtains > 50% of the voting powers, their requests can be perpetually denied by the core team. There would be the possibility of the DAO getting stuck in a deadlock when a whale just keeps on making new proposals and the team has to keep on denying them. But in this scenario users would have time to retrieve their funds.
PS: I wasn’t sure if there was a better category for this, if so I would appreciate it being moved there.