Meeting date: Wednesday, August 5, 2020
Hong Kong: 11:00pm
CEST (Berlin): 5:00pm
UTC Time: 3:00pm
Buenos Aires: 12:00pm
Brooklyn: 11:00am
Houston: 10:00am
Denver: 9:00am
San Francisco: 8:00am
Meeting link: https://meet.jit.si/dxdao
[Jeffthebaker]: The DXD community needs to be engaged more. There is a concern that developers and REP holders are plowing ahead without adequate representation by DXD holders.
[John] An important discussion to have, there are already some discussions on a DXD bridge. Also DXD is only 3 months old. [Augusto] What type of governance would DXD holders provide? What are they interested in?
[Chris P] We may be in a bull market and important to have appropriate measures and material to capture on DeFi growth
[Jeffthebaker] There is a lot of interest in Telegram and already a great group of community members responding to questions
[Sky] Would being able to vote with DXD be sufficient?
[Nylon] Potential action item: Give x% to DXD holders and do a swap (currently 930 DXD holders)
Followup
Need to figure out a way to better engage DXD community. Owning DXD can be an on-ramp to the DXdao
Find a short-term solution and figure out more strategic long-term flow between DXD and REP
How does DXdao take advantage of the (growing) IDO market, how does Mesa?
What is the long-term strategic alignment between Gnosis Protocol and DXdao?
Guilds/subdaos - maybe now ChildDAOs! Nylon presented a doc about how parent/child DAOs could interact and share influence in each other, which would allow different communities within the DXdao to become more autonomous while still connected to DXdao. Didn’t get a link to the document, but think it will come as a DAOtalk post?
Documentation and Manifesto
Manifesto v2.2, additional draft building off of previous version. New version adds brief history and operational details. Discussion will be next week.
We want to have a votes, to secure our investments and to be sure that our investments will be spend not on forks, but on innovative products.
Rep holders can vote on not share any revenue with DXD holders and spend budget on new forks or send revenue to they salaries or vote to hire they friends and pay them from budget.
This is will not attract new investors, this will not build strong community around us, please understand this. Rep is confuse and add only mistrust. If we want to build multi billion dollar DAO with innovative products and strong community must be clear for all:
DXD is only one token build in core, no any other token ever will be created.
DXD holder are owners of all products and fees from this products will be distributed fairy and proportionally to they dxd holding.
Fixed supply
Clear Utility. If team will go away all products will live forever and DXD will be build in core of all projects.
Vote with your 0x address. Vote power = = DXD amount.
Till you will play with this rep and forks you will not see grows like DeFi projects have now. Crypto community do not need your forks, no one will use it, please wake up.
Now is a bull market, we have innovative product OMEN, who already attracted attention from top members in crypto, we have community, we have native token DXD, We have everything to become a unicorn and to be welcome to crypto fam.
I believe, Omen will be #1 prediction market on blockchain with multi billion volume.
People who offer forks like dxswap, dual tokens, put water to our fuel.
DXD must be a core token. No other hidden DAO token. No forks, No mistrust, focus on innovative products like OMEN. This is only way to be recognized and respected by crypto fam.
Sorry I just too long in crypto and i know this kitchen and i really want Omen to became a useful and successful product. Time is now.
I took a deep dive into $DXD over the last days, and here are the most pressing points from an investor’s point of view: $DXD vs $REP
Interests need to be aligned. If I hold a material %age of $DXD, I want to be able to defend my economic interests with voting power.
Impression from forum posts: I’ve seen recent compensation requests that focused only on ETH + REP. DXD didn’t have a prominent role.
REP holder structure is unclear.
On Tuesday’s biz dev call, different ideas were thrown into the pot around how to incentivise activity on Omen and Mesa. That included both REP and DXD. Didn’t sound great from my PoV.
Omen seems to be DXdao’s crown jewel. What’s the best way to include a token?
— Uniswap approach with no prop token. Have min fees to bootstrap growth. Charge fees later.
— Omen token to incentivise liq mining.
— I don’t think DXD will suit itself to liq mining on Omen. Omen-users have an interest in Omen and not in the diversified portfolio that DXD represents. They’d dump DXD imo.
Investor Relations/Information
It takes an enormous amount of time to understand the complexity of DXD. Took me hours to go through all the chats. Whitepaper is outdated.
Nobody will take the time to go through this. You might find some curious people like me but that won’t have a meaningful impact on investor sentiment and price.
Fundamental analysis of DXdao is what got me interested: Low MC, tangible assets (ie the c $6.5m worth of various token), plus the platform/processes around Gov-aaS. Augur has a mc of $230m. If Omen can get half of that => massive upside.
Story too difficult to understand rn + the due diligence involved is massive for a <$5m circ cap token:
— How much does DXdao own in Omen et al?
— Who’s in charge, ie has the multi-sigs?
Bonding Curve
What’s the full story here? Atm, it’s useless: Pricing for buying or selling is horrible.
10% of all future DXdao revenues go to the bonding curve. How is “revenue” defined"?
Listened in to the biz dev call two days ago: Someone said sth along the lines “…bonding curve can issue an infinite amount of $DXD. I think that’s why investors stay away from $DXD”. Couldn’t make full sense of it. Any explanations would be appreciated.
Can DXdao kill the bonding curve?
Strategic direction of DXdao
Where do you want to go? I see the following:
— Crypto project incubator: Akin to a “start up generator”.
— DAO accelerator: Gov-aaS eg DMG. Novel concept. Exciting. Gives DXdao a head-start and a valuation premium. Potential for moon-math.
— Sovereign, crypto-native collective: I see this element covered by the token structure. It reminds me of a “corporate” structure whereby the workers own a material stake in the economic + gov rights (but one cannot go w/out the other).
Venture portfolio
Omen: Nice. Best one in ur portfolio BUT lots of competition: PolydotMarkets, FluxProtocol, RealityCards.io, Augur. FWIW - charge fees only on winning predictions. Otherwise entry barriers too high.
Mesa.eth: I don’t understand the story here and the whole DIA token sale makes it even less clear.
Mix.eth + DXswap: I went through the proposals and could not find any definitive funding sign-off. In my mental investment framework, this is “not funded”.
My 2cts . Happy to help DXdao wrap up these points into a short presentation so that the profile of DXdao gets clearer. Let me know.
Excellent points by Ras and Pete. I would only add that when folks say “REP holders” what they really mean is just a few active addresses which might be controlled by the developers themselves or large DXD holders or individuals from other projects (Gnosis?), etc. No one really knows (or isn’t saying).
According to this site that John mentioned on another thread, this group can’t be more than at most 17 entities:
I took the member data and filtered all REP holders who control at least 1% of supply and have voted at least 10 times. Of these, addresses with index #2, 3, 5, & 6 dominate any vote and usually vote together. Addy #21 and #22 are obviously important team members who create most of the proposals and probably control one or more of the top 4 addys too. It seems obvious to me that these are not 17 decentralized entities, but the few main team members who from a decentralization point of view should really be considered one entity. Why be coy about this?
The folks who control these addresses may also be significant DXD holders outside of the DAO treasury funds (and to be honest, I don’t see why they wouldn’t be since they are clearly in a position to know more about what the project will do than anyone else–though I admit that these addresses do not hold much DXD directly). If so, then giving REP to DXD holders will not advance the stated goal of increasing decentralization of the DXdao.
In either case, this oligarchy controls 80% of the DXD anyway and even just the 6% of DXD that is now unlocked to their control so far is probably enough to dominate governance if REP didn’t exist and unlocked DXD was used instead.
If DXdao wants to claim that separating REP from DXD does something, it seems reasonable to expect the community knows who this REP oligarchy is and how their incentives are different from DXD. Speaking for myself, this is why I have not yet bought any DXD. Only insiders or short-term traders who don’t care are going to hold DXD without this clarity. Giving some form of minority share of REP to DXD holders might make DXD holders feel better, but doesn’t actually give them more power in the DAO.
PeteSmeet’s points are exactly the kinds of issues that DXdao needs to address. We need to address these issues now. $DXD is uninvestible at this time due to a tremendous lack of clarity around the asset and the DXdao ecosystem. First and foremost, there must be significant work done to push out DXD/investor relations materials. Let’s make this a priority - lets get this done BEFORE pushing out DXswap, before Omen and Mesa gain more traction… There’s a very important long-term alignment between $REP and $DXD hodlers, politically and technically, that needs to be sorted out now. Carve the rules and laws of DXdao in stone now - and then amendments can be made later if necessary.
Major issues that the DXdao investor relations materials should address are the following:
How are $DXD holders paid? What does “paid” mean? --> Is revenue actually distributed quarterly/monthly to DXD holders wallets? or does it sit on balance sheet in DXD community wallet? How do DXD holders access the funds to which they are entitled?)
Define terms like “Revenue” for fully transparency and clarity - we all know Revenue to be top-line cash flow income, but can we get all the way down to Net Income so that we know what DXD holders are not paying for, etc. Have a $DXD accounting page Income statements, etc – let’s do accounting at the same high standard of any centralized corporate entity. Is there a CPA that can publicly maintain this for us? At the end of the day we are building revenue generating products that pay investors and builders. Let us be open and transparent. Dxdao will gain a lot of credibility by setting the bar for open, transparent accounting standards.
How much voting power do $DXD holders have? How much voting power do $REP holders have? They must both have voting power. As they both have skin in the game in different forms, passive investment vs payment for work.
4.What is the exact process by which $REP is awarded and distributed? Detail here.
DXD holders are entitle to 10% of “revenue”? Where did this come from. This seems to be extremely low… This percentage needs to be backed up with figures. Why does this percentage make sense? How was this percentage decided upon and what got us to this 10% amount? It feels like someone who is not holder enough DXD and holds a lot of REP came up with 10% for DXD holders. That is not right. Nor is it beneficial to the project. It is only fair to put together a rational financial model that would show why XX% makes sense and why XX% is a reasonable and logical amount to pay $DXD holders. My feeling is that DXD holder should be entitled to at least 25%, at a bare minimum. This 10% should not be related to a dividend in the stock market. That’s not what this at all, why? Because as of now, DXD is not EQUITY in DXdao products. DXD entitles owners to not ownership of cash flows and technology built… 10% is an absurdly low amount to be paying DXD investors.
What is each product in the Dxdao suite? How much of each product is owned by DXdao? Who maintains each product? What is the market size and share that each product is going after? How big (how many users/how much volume/how much fees) could each product potentially be? Roadmap?
What is the process for amendments to the voting process/governance. How do DXD and REP holders work together to make decisions long term? How is this a sustainable model?
The only one beneficar from Dxdao products is DXD holder, that is for what he was designed for.
All revenue after expensise will go to dxd holders only.
For example IDEX share 50% from all DEX fees to IDEX holders.
Here is Kyber Network Staking → Current Network fee: 0.2%, Burn: 4.3%, Reward: 70%, Rebate: 25.7%
I do not think any one in crypto specialy Dxdao will reward holders/stakers with 10%
and all revenus send to core team pockets. Plus we as community own “i hope” all Dxdao products.
You say “The only one beneficar from Dxdao products is DXD holder, that is for what he was designed for. All revenue after expensise will go to dxd holders only.”
Are you telling me that DXD holders would participate in all costs associated with the DXdao? That would be participating in Revenue. This is quite confusing. There seems to be very little clarity here. Not good.
The more I think about the issue of voting power for DXD holders, the more I see this as one of the major issues. Apologies if any of this has already been considered; I’ve been tracking the discussions on the forum, but am not involved in any of the weekly calls.
If workers are compensated directly in ETH, the less alignment they have with the long-term success (read: profitability) of DxDAO products. While there certainly is a realistic need for workers to be compensated at least partially in a cash form (ETH being sufficiently liquid for us to call it “cash” here), perhaps greater consideration could be put into a comp model that more closely resembles a typical tech startup: you’ll have enough cash to survive, but the stock (DXD) is what makes you rich.
And the benefits of this change are twofold: one, it forces REP holders (i.e., workers) to care about how revenue is generated and shared with the DXD holders (i.e., investors) who fund the treasury. And two, it potentially enables the DAO to allocate more of the treasury in other places, whether to fund more ventures or burn cash in driving adoption efforts, or even simply to bump the percentage of the treasury which DXD holders are entitled to.
Sorry I just too long in crypto and i know this kitchen and i really want Omen to became a useful and successful product. Time is now.
