Genesis 1.0 : Proposed Reputation Adjustment


As has been discussed previously, there needs to be a reputation readjustment moving into Genesis 1.0. We propose that Genesis adopt a reputation structure whereupon its members have a vested interest in spreading the adoption of DAOs, the DAOstack platform, and use of the GEN token. Genesis 1.0 should be structured so that anyone with skin in the game of the DAOstack ecosystem can join and receive reputation.

Why do we need a reputation adjustment?

In order for Genesis DAO to grow into a mature ecosystem, we need to move beyond our small community dynamics. Specifically, teams and groups and individuals with skin-in-the-game should be given more reputation in the network, since they have something to lose.

Specifically, we are looking to enable the following two groups the ability to earn reputation in Genesis:

  1. GEN investors (groups who hold GEN tokens and stake these tokens in exchange for reputation)
  2. Genesis Funders (groups who send money to Genesis DAO in exchange for reputation). Note that this reputation distribution mechanism will be implemented after the implementation of 1) above. There are details here that have not been worked out (DAOtalk forthcoming immediately on why this is so).

At the end of the day, a reputation readjustment is needed to make better decisions, by allowing those with skin in the game to partake in our governance process. Those with skin in the game have the most to lose, and are incentivized to make decisions that will lead to the growth of our ecosystem as a whole.

Proposed reputation distribution of Genesis 1.0

Below are the proposed immediate changes to reputation distribution for Genesis 1.0. In order to minimize confusion, Genesis Alpha will be renamed to Genesis 1.0. Genesis Alpha members will not need to do anything, and will automatically be a part of Genesis 1.0.

We (DAOstack team) propose:

  • That the existing Reputation issued by Genesis Alpha is of ~47K. Reputation will be diluted at a rate of 5,875 Rep per month to those who have locked GEN.
  • That new members in Genesis will not receive reputation in Genesis 1.0 without completing work
  • Along with the suggested changes suggested to our reputation allocation, the social cap of 2% on Rep will be removed.

These changes could lead to the following reputation adjustment over the course of 24 months (Note: the exact rate of dilution depends on how much reputation is distributed to to proposers for their work). The examples below use a 5% growth rate in reputation distributed to Genesis 1.0 proposers.

In conclusion, Genesis 1.0 aims to reward those with skin in the game. This shift should better align our ecosystem, and allow us to make better decisions that align with our long term objectives. We hope you agree and would love to hear your thoughts, let’s discuss here :seedling:

This post was written in collaboration with @eric.arsenault :v:

  1. Genesis Alpha REP gets to vote on this, right?

  2. What happens to over 50% of the Alpha REP stranded in abandoned accounts or accounts obtained under false pretenses? As REP for Funding will take place much sooner than the two years, the chart represents the minimum Alpha REP dilution of more than 5X over 2 years, but is likely to be notably higher, taking even large Alpha REP holders down to 0.1% range.

  3. What is the policy of staking GEN for REP by those with a different cost basis:
    a. DAOstack insiders (in the sense of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
    b. DAOstack employees
    c. major pre-ICO and ICO participants
    d. Custodial accounts

  4. Does a direct translation of GEN staking for REP obviate the need for the per-proposal outcome-based staking, central to the holographic method? Does an ‘absolute’ vote remain and how will its level be calibrated?
    Currently even most active proposals garner low five figure GEN, while 40M+ has been issued (a factor of 2000X). With GEN positions tied to REP and a vote outcome that affects REP and decides proposal staking payout, there can be very strange arbitrage opportunities, at levels of six or even seven figures GEN, entirely unrelated to the proposal content, all taking place against extremely thin and opaque GEN market(s).

  5. By having a direct link between fungible GEN and REP, one can calculate a REP valuation using one of several accepted methods for the cost of staking. Once direct transactions of funds handed to the DAO for REP are instituted, fiat valuation is unavoidable. Will that create reporting requirements for the current Alpha REP holders, specifically in major jurisdictions of DAOstack operation, like Israel, Germany, Spain, Australia, the US? Some of these jurisdictions will readily classify REP as being a valuable consideration or having a material value, regardless of availability of legally compliant fungibility or presence of liquidity. When GEN is ruled to be a security in any of these or other jurisdictions, will it also taint REP?

  6. For the individuals who experienced REP buy-back with tokens of specific fiat value, what are the effects of a large difference between the rates they were offered (or imposed) compared with upcoming estimates of the REP valuation, given lack of disclosure of profound DAO structure changes being worked upon at the time?

  7. By explicitly designing in REP whales, many of institutional nature, don’t you forgo any appearance of decentralization and a human-based democratic process, leading to some as yet unseen but profoundly superior future? Now I understand the split vote of DAOstack employees on the “real name” proposal, with the larger percentage on the Against side and the top executives not voting. Identification requirements for the entities is unclear and requesting any identification from investors may lead to the requirement in major jurisdictions of doing it at the KYC level.

  8. I am surprised that for this organization “skin-in-the-game” translates into funds or fungible GEN quite so readily and on such a tremendous scale, supposedly since “they have something to lose.” Clearly, the ones staking GEN are not experiencing a loss in a GAAP sense, even if some opportunity or volatility cost may be attributed, hence REP valuation. The Funding entities will use their REP positions to drive their own causes and commercial interests, unless they are explicitly formed as a non-profit and such a grant is within their charter.

  9. I perceive that individual members, who are industry professionals and have contributed many hundreds of hours of a dedicated effort pro-bono, to have provided significant material value to Genesis, easily valued in five figures EUR. An objective method to price it would be to compare a fully burdened cost of DAOstack employees engaged with Genesis and their relative contribution over a similar time period. Likewise, in my professional assessment based on decades of experience in commercial technology business, most proposals have delivered value at a cost that is a small fraction of the prevailing market rates and should get a corresponding REP credit.


Thanks for starting the discussion @wkarshat, there’s quite a few questions here so a response won’t be forthcoming to all till tomorrow.

Quick answer to 1. Yes.

Also one clarification - it’s not GEN staking for Rep, it is GEN locking. :slightly_smiling_face:

Thanks everyone for participating in the Genesis call today. It was clear there is still a bit of confusion around this topic. Here is the TLDR:

  • Genesis Alpha members reputation currently stands at 100%
  • We will introduce a scheme which allows GEN holders to lock tokens for certain periods of time, and receive Rep in exchange. Every month, the amount of new reputation issued to GEN lockers will be constant.
  • Assuming you have 2% rep currently, in one year you would have around 0.75% rep if you don’t propose anything, and don’t lock any GEN
  • The 2% social cap we’ve had on rep will be removed as well as part of this process

Hope this helps. Sorry Walter, I don’t have time to go into all of these points right now, hopefully someone else will jump in.

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@eric.arsenault if you don’t have time, maybe you can choose yourself the questions that you think are the most important, or the ones that you feel more comfortable answering, and have someone completing them.

I don’t mean to be rude, mate :hugs:, but I feel that it’s not appropriate to turn down answering Walter’s questions just because there are “too many” of them. This proposed change is massive, and Walter put a lot of effort into carefully crafted questions that address critical aspects.

Here is my take on some of them, as someone who just learned about the proposed change on yesterday’s call.

1- @Kate confirmed that Genesis Alpha REP would vote on this, which is good at least for signaling purposes. Now, since DAOstack provides the funds needed for Genesis to operate, it has also the power to impose the change, should it be rejected by a slight majority of current REP holders (by “forking” Genesis, so to speak, and letting the old one die).

2- I don’t think that this is a big problem anymore, in a context that creates an organic dilution of REP. That being said, I’d favor a specific dilution of REP hold by inactive members, including for REP issued to hodlers who would lock their GENs. If the very purpose of the change is to offer them a way to be more active in the promotion of DAOstack-powered DAOs, it would make sense to hold them accountable for it, by slashing unused/useless REP.

We have a situation now of being unable to pass non-boosted proposal because the REP turnout is way too low. In addition, it may feel unfair to many that some keep a high level of reputation without doing anything, while late-comers start with a much lower reputation level. Reputation decay for inactive REP holders could address these issues, that can only become more prevalent with the proposed change.

Admittedly, this could be a distinct discussion thread! :blush:

3- I don’t think the cost basis (which reflects differences in then-opportunity costs or risks or provided work) should be taken into account.

4- This question touches one of the critical issues for me. There was a separation of concerns between GEN/staking and REP/voting, which made DAOstack and the holographic consensus so unique.

Now, assuming after about seven months (according to the chart) 50% of Genesis DAO’s reputation is in the hands of the hodlers who locked their GENs, the people who get to decide what’s being voted are the same as the ones who decide how to vote.

And these people are contributors of capital, rather than contributors of work, as @Grace pointed it out on the call, so it may totally change the ethos of Genesis DAO.

One possible way to address this issue would be to set a ceiling on REP % issued through GEN-locking, so that there’s a set balance between labor and capital – balance that could be changed through proposals!

I want to emphasize the fact that this concern has nothing to do with the ability of the DAO to serve its mission of fostering the emergence and growth of DAOstack-powered DAOs. I certainly admit that having capital owners as the main driving force of an organization, rather than its workers, may be more effective. In itself, it may be a sufficient reason for supporting this change, from the perspective of both GEN holders and DAOstack supporters. The end may justify the means, for some of us. Personally, I’m still unsure.

5- Sounds unlikely to me, for many reasons, but I’ll let lawyers discuss it :slight_smile:

7- The only way to maintain decentralization through a REP cap by member (like the current 2%) would be to force physical identification of the participants locking GENs.

We can work with pseudonyms when REP is given to contributors of work because there’s only so much that a single contributor can do. Such 2% cap would be useless with capital contributions (GEN-locking) since large hodlers could use multiple addresses.

Hence the alternative is: keep the 2% cap, but enforce physical identification of members, or remove the 2% cap, and welcome REP whales who may eventually govern Genesis DAO. I’m holding my breath here, waiting for the blog post to come :slight_smile:

8- Very valid point. In that sense, GEN locking is very different from a real work contribution, for which people actually SPEND time and effort. The “skin in the game” argument is not that strong.

9- I disagree with this last point (too bad to end with a disagreement!), at the very least for practical reasons (I think @matan mentioned them yesterday). A fair assessment of past pro-bono work would be a nightmare. I have many other reasons, but I think that this point is related to a different concern, so I’ll stop here for now.


Hey @philh great responses.

On @wkarshat questions I mentioned that we’d indeed be responding sometime today @papa_raw is thinking on a couple of the more legally technical ones (and getting domain expertise input) to ensure true robustness. I don’t think @eric.arsenault is turning down answering them - it’s not all on him. I sincerely appreciate the time you have taken :seedling:

From your responses I’m seeing a couple of interesting proposals to specific problems.

REP dilution/slash for inactive members. As you mention unused rep will eventually be diluted by the proposed model but I understand your inclination towards designing for active REP, if we were to also do a slash - what would be the ratio - we might not want to make it too harsh…? Agree that this could be a separate discussion thread but let’s continue here for a bit :slightly_smiling_face:

REP ceiling to GEN locking is an interesting proposal - of course a main effect would be to limit the amount that some could lock GEN and necessitate identity. Technically this is complicated as the scheme has already been built and audited (not specifically for this case - it already exists) I’m curious to hear from others what challenges this could bring?

Identity verfication indeed this is the main reason for identity verification - if we’re going to cap anything we need to be able to prevent multiple addresses.

Skin in the Game can also mean work in the DAO so perhaps we need some different wording: to paraphrase @ezra_w who has forseen this problem ‘simply contributing work often means you have some skin in the game already: if I’ve invested time building and learning the DAOstack system, I will gain more from that system succeeding. Likewise if I’ve invested in relationships in the DAOstack community. So maybe it’a more correct to say we want to “fortify” that skin in the game with GEN.’ The ability of those who work and propose to receive REP and ETH/DAI and also GEN (which they can also additionally lock for REP) in Genesis 1.0 means that there is good value flow with the ability to gain livelihood and influence - do you agree?

And Phil, while I’m all for elegant intellectual tennis and digging further into the mechanics can I ask for your personal reaction to the proposal? Do you see the need? Like it? Dislike?

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It’s “satisficing”, seems like a pretty good next move on the chess board.

But it has a lowering interest rates feel to it. It will work for a while, but if Genesis keeps solving problems like this, it will blow-up.


Hi @Kate, thanks for your answer!

Sorry if I misunderstood Eric’s answer, I know how cool and supportive he is anyway, so peace :sunglasses::peace_symbol:

REP dilution/slash for inactive members.

Colony has an interesting decay function. It has been already discussed on DAOtalk: Reputation Decay. I don’t have a firm opinion here, because this topic is itself part of the more comprehensive issue of “compositionality” mentioned in DAOstack whitepaper. I’d vote for a decay function though, but knowing that it wouldn’t be enough to address some issues raised in the thread I just mentioned.

REP ceiling to GEN locking is an interesting proposal - of course a main effect would be to limit the amount that some could lock GEN and necessitate identity.

It wouldn’t require any change regarding identity. What I had in mind was a REP ceiling for ALL GEN-locking REP holders, seen as a collective stakeholder. BTW, this approach inspired from multistakeholder coops could be equally valuable with respect to other stakeholders segments such as DAOstack-powered DAOs and Contributing organizations, mentioned in Q1 Genesis Update. A fix distribution between these segments is compatible with a dynamic distribution within each group.

And Phil, while I’m all for elegant intellectual tennis and digging further into the mechanics can I ask for your personal reaction to the proposal? Do you see the need? Like it? Dislike?

Honestly, I just don’t know! :exploding_head:

I’m sorry if I sounded like playing some gratuitous game. It is not my intent. I sincerely care about all these issues. And it’s actually easier to grasp well-delimited questions like the ones listed by Walter than to assess the whole thing. The proposal is really big. I need more time and more information to process it. I need to understand not only how it would work and what are the risks, but also which purpose it serves and what are the consequences for each type of stakeholder.

But I can say that generally speaking, I tend to favor the inclusion of all stakeholders in the governance. Therefore, it seems legitimate to me to give a way for GEN hodlers to participate to Genesis DAO. I suspect that Genesis DAO may be perceived as the initial experiment of DAOstack mechanisms, a sort of lab handled by a small community of practitioners. This narrative collides with the scenario of granting influence to investors. However, considering that “supporting the GEN economy” and “contributing to the development of the DAOstack software” were set as goals for GenDAO put things in a very different light.

BTW, there might still be some relevance to a DAO dedicated to practitioners, researchers and experimenters, with contribution-based REP only. It’s probably easier to have only one DAO to focus on at this stage, but the new “version” doesn’t necessarily mean that the current one is pointless.


On the topic of Genesis 1.0’s Rep distribution:

As Kate wrote in the top post, I think the idea here is to

adopt a reputation structure whereupon its members have a vested interest in spreading the adoption of DAOs, the DAOstack platform, and use of the GEN token.

To do that, we need to design a system that is sure to grant appropriate amounts of Reputation to those with a stake in that mission. I think we’re modeling two basic stakeholder groups for Genesis 1.0:

  1. Long-term GEN holders: this one has been talked to death. It uses the GEN-locking mechanism, etc. etc.
  2. People with a stake built from time and labor invested into the DAOstack ecosystem. This includes both current Genesis Alpha participants and future participant-workers in Genesis 1.0. This type of stake is much more heterogenous and unquantifiable, but starting with

current REP (for people that have some now)
value of work done + some GEN that can be locked (how workers will ask for Rep in Genesis 1.0)

seems like a fine starting point.

Reputation Decay

In 1.0, like in the Alpha, Reputation will naturally decay because of inflation. This is actually quite a complex mechanism, since any amount of Reputation can be given out or slashed in proposals, and the GEN-locking parameters can also be adjusted. If the DAO feels investors are getting too high a portion of the Rep, it can choose to gift workers more Reputation per work done or change the amount of Rep granted for locking GEN. If the DAO feels Reputations are decaying too quickly, it can start minting Rep slower, or even slash some (new schemes could be created to make this easier).

If you have 1% of total Rep, the only way you’ll maintain 1% over time is by continuously locking more GEN or doing more DAO work, or the DAO has to be slashing Rep as fast as it’s minting it. It’s really hard to predict how the DAO will behave, of course, but this dynamic seems complex and flexible enough not to introduce a specialized Rep decay scheme right away.

Note that voting and staking in the DAO give little to no Reputation right now, and so simply participating as a voter or staker will probably not be enough to stop your Reputation from decaying, unless the protocol is changed.

Disclaimer: I don’t know exactly how the GEN-locking mechanism is going to work, and I also don’t know what the research team is looking into wrt the protocol right now. Some of these assumptions could be pretty far off.


I’m a bit late to the game re:this conversation, but maybe fresh eyes (childlike in my curiosity) are useful?

  1. I see two ways to get REP here - work for it, or “buy” it via locking up GEN. I understand working for it. I do not quite understand the motivation for the GEN lockup. Specifically - what is the expected positive outcome to the ecosystem of locking GEN?
  2. What is the expected outcome of having two classes of REP holders - those who sweat for it and those who simply bought their way in?
  3. What is the preferred ratio between the two REP cohorts [Earned]:[Bought]? Is this important? The expected or preferred ratio could be used to adjust how much REP the “work” is worth. For example, say we want to maintain a 50%:50% [1:1] ratio. Perhaps it is based on a 1 month “adjustment” lag. At the beginning of each month, the ratio is calculated and if the “buyers” have overbought (i.e. the ratio favors them), then we add in a REP inflation value [RIV] (so normally doing work X gets you Y REP, but this month it gets you Y*[RIV] in an attempt to rebalance the ratio. This would require the development of a baserate REP reward for proposal/work types [Yt]. Users would not ask for “32 REP” they would ask for “1 unit of type Y3 REP” (because they are doing Y3 work) and the amount of REP that equated to would be calculated at reward time to rebalance the system back to the desired ratio. For completeness - if the ratio is in the favor of the sweaty workers, the “lock Q GEN for R REP” value gets adjusted (or the work REP unit multiplier goes <1.0 until the next calculation). I chose 1 month as an example. It could be continuous balancing or whatever makes sense.

The regular rebalance would also be a natural way to keep rich GEN whales from controlling the system and demotivating the sweaty. Whale locks a load of GEN, thanks d00d, every worker just got a hefty raise!

Also, anyone sitting still is getting diluted to virtual nothingness.

Two things, real quick:

1/ Reduced supply = increased price (Econ 101). Since GenDAO controls 40m GEN, an increase in the price of GEN is an increase in the amount in grants it can distribute, and an increase in funds available to the ecosystem.

2/ Locked GEN = skin in the game. Your (long-term) interests are aligned with GenDAO and the GEN economy for multiple years at a time, because if it goes tits up, the value of what you’ve locked will (presumably) decrease. If you invert this thinking, everyone who is locked has the same incentive to make GenDAO a long-term success. From the Mission blog:

Skin in the game means having something at risk when taking a decision. In order for Genesis to make smarter decisions in managing its resources, we believe stakeholders should generally be staked in the GEN economy

This has been stated before, but Genesis will have the ability to mint 40m GEN over its lifespan. The expected outcome of this system is a higher priced GEN, which will lead to more grants being distributed to more “sweaters” due to the interests and actions of the “buyers.” This is good for everyone as value creators (sweaters) have the budget they need to create value :v:

I like where you’re going with this, and I think there should be more “autobalancing” schemes for Reputation in the future; it’s just the implementation that you’ve described here does not seem easy (given my layman’s understanding of smart contracts). However, there is a target of a 50/50 split after one year of locking, per the Mission blog. I think that’s a decent target, but I can’t say that it’s the “best” target as nobody has really tried this before.

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Hi Pat,

Big appreciation to you for your deapth, sincerety and dilligence in chipping away at the critical issues traversed on these multiple discussion channels. Always exciting to see your name pop up in a thread.

My question speaks to bandwidth as skin in the game, inclusion for investors of such, adoption of DAO lifestyle at scale and sustainability of participation in the absence of UBI .

A DAO participant who doesn’t have the means to continuiosly lock more GEN, is a passionate DAOist and “sweats” by reading discussions, propposals and forums, thinking deeply on the plethora of perspectives, values and factors at play so as to vote responsibly and who’s “skin in the game” is the time they spend actually turning up to hear, process and understand the many thinking voices of the DAO which time they make unavailable for earning their personal living is a participant without whom IMHO real scale adoption of the DAO spirit cannot be claimed.

It appears to me that without propposing successfully this group will stand to see their REP deacay if they make it into what is looking to become a highly meritocratic Genesis 1.0 at all.

It would seem to me that should DAO be truly inclusive of participants who genuinely care for those of it’s values that set it apart from the existing governance mechanisms and make it relevant as categorically ethicaly superior to its predesessor mechanisms the goal might be to provide for these “sweaters” to constitute a significant if not biggest section of the participant population - specificaly beacuse this would set the DAO apart from the organisational mechamisms driven primarily by ROI interests of commercial powers that may.

I am very new here and feel trully humbled by the depth, quality and gravity of work I see beeing done here.

I do however wonder how much the DAO I see Genesis1.0 becoming with the propposed Rep Structure will support inclusion of those netizens who are here to invest their time and attention primarily in voting responcibly yet by their economic deffinition will have the most skin in the game since they do not have the “play money” to invest and don’t care to get richer nearly as much as they care be a part of collective intelligence.

I think addressing this head on is necessary in order to articulate why this wouldn’t be the case, or should very rarely be the case in practice, or at the very least, establish why it may be more fair for this person you’re describing to be “decayed out.”

First off, let’s turn once again to our handy principles post:

  1. We want those who contribute work to have skin in the game

Builders, growth teams, predictors, and other contributors of the DAOstack ecosystem should be rewarded in GEN for their efforts, which they can lock to generate voting power. This aligns incentives across different interest groups, further strengthening Genesis’s economy.

In digesting this, we can understand that there are not one, but two pathways to gaining Rep:

1/ Locking GEN
2/ Contributing to the DAO and gaining Reputation through work, and in addition being rewarded in GEN tokens that can be locked (#2 encompasses #1).

What you’re describing is a third pathway, that is:

3/ A passionate DAOist and “sweats” by reading discussions, propposals and forums, thinking deeply on the plethora of perspectives, values and factors at play so as to vote responsibly and who’s “skin in the game” is the time they spend actually turning up to hear, process and understand the many thinking voices of the DAO…

I would say that this is a good start to contributing. Let’s label the persona you’re describing, who is doing these things, as Persona C. But let’s construct two more personas here to better understand the opportunity cost of A having more Reputation than A and B:

Persona A

Persona B is a VC and has purchased and locked one million GEN from the open market, pushing the price up 50%, from .50c to .75c. Their market buys has thus increased the available treasury of Genesis from $20m to $30m. They lock their one million GEN for two years and begin generating about ~1% Reputation per month, as the monthly inflation is ~5%, and four million GEN are already locked.

Persona B

Persona B regularly hosts meetups and/or workshops educating around decentralized governance. For each meetup or workshop, they request 100 Reputation, or around .25%, and they do this regularly every month, which results in one or two additional DAO contributors joining monthly. In addition to the .25% Rep they’ve earned, they also request 10000 GEN per month, which they then lock for two years every time it is received. After four months of work they’re now generating .1% Rep per month passively, in addition to the 1% of Rep they’ve earned through merit.

Now, if we evaluate the above three personas, I think to me it becomes clear that Persona C should actually have less Reputation than A and B. It seems profoundly unfair to me to weight or reward C for practicing an abstract value-set when both A and B have added tangible value. It may be the case, as you describe, that A and B are not actually aligned with GenDAO’s values, and that C is the wiser, more capable decision-maker. I want to note that there are ways that we could potential engineer rewards for C in this regard. One that I’ve mulled over myself is a scheme where voting on proposals that either pass/fail (but not timeout, as this isn’t spam resistant) is rewarded by a GEN airdrop (which could then be locked for Reputation).

And this, right here, is where we diverge: economics (crypto or otherwise) isn’t referred to as the “dismal science” because it seeks ethical perfection, but because when opportunity costs are understood in total, we can pick the best worst option, which is paradoxically the most ethical choice we can make. A perfectly inclusive system does not exist in reality, as we are limited by scarcity – this being said, I firmly believe DAO governance allows us to design more inclusive systems. In general, I agree with you: having responsible voters who are aligned with our principles is a sufficient condition for Genesis to succeed. But having funding and folks working hard to make it a success are necessary conditions to exist, and if we are seeking a just system, that is, an ethical and fair system, we have to take care of these conditions foremost.

Reduced supply = increased price ONLY in a demand scenario. I am not familiar with the numbers so I assume you are suggesting a significant amount of GEN gets locked each time such that the demand outstrips the supply to keep the price up? The amount of GEN being traded in the markets right now is close to 0, so locking GEN up will (currently) do nothing for price.

Is there anything I can read about where the scenarios have been laid out - with numbers, regarding how this locking function should work? For instance, how much do you auction and how often? Is there an ongoing “max locked GEN” goal? How does it change over time? How does the dilution of GenDAO control over GEN as it gets auctioned affect the DAOs ability to maintain currency control (+price)?

You’re right to call this out – I am making some assumptions here – namely that the work Genesis does will lead to increased demand primarily via:

  • Growing the DAO ecosystem and the use of GEN within holographic consensus
  • Promotion of the GEN token leading to increased speculation
  • Effective monetization and management of the Arc.Hives registries

I don’t have many doubts that this can be effectively done given the market caps of other “DAOs,” such as Decred or DASH, but it does require collective effort on our behalf. I’d like to note that too often the team is asked “what are you doing to increase the price of GEN?” without individuals first considering that it’s a collective effort – it’s what DAOs are about.

Maybe @Lior can chime in here.

Dear Pat,

Thank you very much for your responce.

It is my hope that thoughs below can be taken on their philosophical merit ( or lack thereof where such transpires ) and not their contravercial tone.

I reinforce that my discussion cotributions arise from deep appreciation of the skills, commitment and resources continuously devoted to development of Genesis and seek to encourage depth of exploration of the propposed new specs rather to criticise them or suggest their failings.

Here goes:

A system learns through failure of it’s parts.

A system some parts of which are highly prone to failure while others are at risc by nature of their compositional priority stands to learn only that which it already knows.

A traditional government notably tasks it’s agenda with its own survival, and all to often the very purpose of its existance falls secondary to it’s indurance and proliferation of it’s power.

A DAO does not need to be liquid to exist in the most minimal sence of this word. ( this statement might be obiter, but it is true )

A DAO also does not need to be fair to be liquid.

A DAO does however need to be compositionally sophisticated to learn.

Are we trying to learn to get as good as a sustainable nation state economy or are we trying to learn to mitigate the tragedy of commons with inplimentation of Holographic Consensus for empowerment of local divercity ( A Nobel Prize-winning notion btw )?

A blanket definition of “skind in the game” as “money in the game” is just another means of fostering elitist capitalism.

How might this reconsile with our number 1 Value of decentralization of power and wealth with a view to disincentivize seizure of authority and capture of regulatory bodies by moneyed corporate structures and leverage of these powers against the common interest?

O, I guess we’ll just make sure that our commons consist of money and the value and “voices” of the “people” can just be unilaterally represented by a group of employees ( with their paying jobs being their skin in the game ).

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I’m happy to dive into philosophy, @SofiaD, but you haven’t really addressed any of my points, and I don’t see how the above strictly relates to the Reputation adjustment. I would kindly ask that you:

  • Share your breakdown for an ideal Reputation distribution, after one year, quantitatively broken down by segment, as well as the schemes needed to best facilitate this distribution.
  • Explain how this distribution best optimizes the development and proliferation of the DAOstack project.

If you would be willing to do these two things, I’d be happy to continue chatting.

These are not orthogonal objectives :slight_smile:

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More specifically my initial point regarding the group you determined as C has been very aptly discussed by Ezra in his post 9/17:

“Note that voting and staking in the DAO give little to no Reputation right now, and so simply participating as a voter or staker will probably not be enough to stop your Reputation from decaying, unless the protocol is changed.”

Here I would point out that based on objectives post point:

"3 We want those who contribute work to have skin in the game

Builders, growth teams, predictors, and other contributors of the DAOstack ecosystem should be rewarded in GEN for their efforts, which they can lock to generate voting power. This aligns incentives across different interest groups, further strengthening Genesis’s economy."

  • I would have though that persona C would be predominantly a staker and only occasionally a voter with “skin” in the game which is their time - more so then money (so obviously unilaterally synonimous with “skin” in the objectives post - rightly this issue was reconised by Kate, but I have not yet seen a real nechanism for expansion of term “skin” to encompass time - perhaps you can point me to it? ).

I am not disputing this:

“Now, if we evaluate the above three personas, I think to me it becomes clear that Persona C should actually have less Reputation than A and B.”

My statement regarding persona C desirably being the biggest group was about the numbers of persona C’s not the total proportion of rep they might hold as a group and seemed valid to me because at scale there will be too many propposals for any one person to attend to all of them so the holographic consensus would benefit from a large population of stakers ( this is of course providing boosting is still a thing ).

Population C of course will not be generating a great deal of rep per individual outside of contribultion of passed propposals and Gen locking and under the propposed decay function will be dacayed out at a rate that will actually keep that population out of the voting pool in increasing numbers as such a system will also be deterrent of more class C participants onboarding to Genesis1.0

Perhaps this situation lends itself to special management? - is humbly my key point.

Not disputing the economic ethics you suggest.

Your comment regarding non-orthogonal objectives is indeed also sound and I accept it gratefully.

Please help me understand sentence starting with : " It may be the case…" In the extract below:

“It seems profoundly unfair to me to weight or reward A for practicing an abstract value-set when both A and B have added tangible value. It may be the case, as you describe, that B and C are not actually aligned with GenDAO’s values, and that A is the wiser, more capable decision-maker. I want to note that there are ways that we could potential engineer rewards for A in this regard. One that I’ve mulled over myself is a scheme where voting on proposals that either pass/fail (but not timeout, as this isn’t spam resistant) is rewarded by a GEN airdrop (which could then be locked for Reputation).”

So I can better understand your rep numbers spread and the surrounding arguments, please, would you mind checking placement of the "A"s the "B"s and the "C"s in your post 13/17 as I feel you might end up making some corrections there.

Fathful thanks:)

In terms of special management, the way I see it, there’s a few options here:

1/ perhaps some sort of LGN minting similar to this idea by @AdrienDLT for correct/frequent voters.
2/ perhaps enforcing a social consensus where the most active and correct voters each month could manually ask for more Reputation.

There’s probably more but the bigger picture is how to slice the Rep pie for these folks vs. lockers and sweaters.

Heh, good catch. Does correct labeling clear up “it may be the case?”

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Thank you for the edit, now everything in that reply alligns for me.

Lets look at persona C’s contribution and evolutionary options and how to cap their total rep.

In Genesis Alpha on-bording to take part in the staking game had three key motivations:

  1. resembling social proof

ie: cat knows the propposer/working group member personally, and wants to support or discourage them regardless of or considering propposal quality and propposes to on-bord so they can stake a few Gen they buy to boost or boo.

  1. Resembling speculative trading:

Ie: a cat hears of Mother of All DAO and propposes to on-bord so they can stake a few Gen they buy to boost or boo to earn more Gen which they then want to sell for money.

  1. Resembling early participation activity with a view to learn through participation.

Outcomes of staking as bottom layer of holographic consensus:

  1. Boosting or not boosting of the propposal.

  2. Distinguishment of the propposal staked on by means of basic attention it attracts amongst Genesis DAO community as well as the greater world community members of which encounter the DAO and recognise it’s imporatnce on-board to the DAO.

  3. Basic form of curation.

  4. Correct stake earns a bit of Gen.

Greater numbers of stakers in the community contributing ( pls correct me if I’m wrong -) to consensus resillience of the boosting layer of the holograpgic consensus.

In comes Genesis 1.0 and lets assume that:

  1. Genesis 1.0 has been designated the “funds-minder DAO” for the stack with the logically determined objectives.

  2. A list of activity-based persona types has been developed and passed upon by the DAO.

  3. On-boarding propposal now has a “propposer determines their on-boarding participation level” factor and quallifcation factors are curated by the DAO, where suppose: a locker is also on-bording as a voter and a staker; a worker is not necessarily on-bording as a locker; a staker ( Persona C) is on-bording as just that, with little or no reputation which is immedeately subject to prescribed decay; existing voters in the ecosystem stand to sink down to staker level.

  4. Persona-group rep capping is at play ( proportions TBD ).

  5. All persona groups have staking rights based on unlocked Gen holdings and stand to receive Locked GEN airdrops ( drop size TBD ) in accordance with the established relevant mechanism and earn rep accordingly.

  6. Work and signalling propposal templates and curation are at play.

The function formally performed by staking now takes a slightly different character as the likelihood of propposal passing now linked to curational endorsement.

Here it is valuable to add that it could be valuable if currative assesment of work/signal propposal fomat compliance and values allignmen can be expressed in “degrees” eg: “Curated, 90% of values allignment and 80% compliance achieved, aspects for improvement: outreach diversity, delivearbles.”

Curational function of staking is now focused on speculative curation of the aspects designated by DAO curation for improvement and extent of improvement prceived by the staker to be likely or taking place as the propposal is improved by the author, the social proof function is arguably mitigated by DAO curation and the staker education outcme is magnified by DAO curation.

Overall prediction accuracy of an earnest persona C in amplified.

Motivation to purchase staking Gen is amplified improving GEN economy.

Basic attention to DAO-curated propposals across all persona groups is incentivised with roll-on added quality of total staking population distrubition ( which if course includes As and Bs ).

Persona C population variance is influenced by the length of compulsory minimum lock-up period ( TBD ) of the airdopped locked Gen and the prospects of either continuing to lock to gain rep or selling unlocked Gen correspondingly incentivise long term commited C’s and short term commited C’s to manage themselves into or out of voting population.

I feel like maybe the community and of course yourself Pat, should look into this model and see what might be wrong or missing here and if it might be a sound stepping stone for forward momentum of the issue of group rep capping in Genesis 1.0.