DXdao Spring - Final Restructuring

This proposed plan includes:

  • Discontinuing DXD redemptions
  • Implementing a fixed DXD claim process against 70% of the treasury
  • Allocating the remaining treasury to products

This proposal suggests immediately halting the DXD redemption and sunsetting DXD at a fixed 70% NAV. The existing redemption system is a gradually worsening downward spiral, eventually forcing REP holders to choose between honoring redemptions or paying themselves.

We suggest sunsetting DXD at a fixed 70% of treasury NAV (-DXD -SWPR -ENS), for this a snapshot will be taken on the 1st of April 00:00:00 UTC. A fixed ETH/DXD exchange rate will be determined, and these funds will be allocated to a redemption smart contract that will exchange 1 DXD for the predetermined ETH price. After one year, the DAO can reclaim any unclaimed funds. Outstanding contributor vesting will immediately vest to contributors.

The remaining 30% of the treasury will be distributed as follows:

  • 50% Swapr (+ SWPR + ARB tokens)
  • 50% Carrot
  • ENS tokens allocated to Nimi

Product teams will have the freedom to utilize the funds as they deem appropriate, with no obligations to DXdao. Yet, the funds shall be used to further product development.

This proposal sunsets DXdao and the DXD token, yet provides a good chunk of funding to product teams to pursue DXdao’s vision and continue building without the bureaucratic overhead currently throttling DXdao.


Novel idea though I question why token holders should take the bare minimum of 70% and leave the remaining funds with no obligations. Imo in this situation, there should be a friendly compromise and DXD holders should be getting 75 or 80% as a pay-off to get them to leave.


This is actually not a terrible idea IMHO.

Of course, if I understand the proposal correctly I’d receive all my outstanding vesting immediately (?) which would be a decent pay out for me and everyone else who is vesting DXD and this proposal also suggests a generous allocation to the Nimi team of which I’m one of the founding members.

It looks like everyone is rushing to redeem their DXD (largest 3 holders are out or currently in process of exiting) and contributors have also started to dump on vest (me included). With the current 30% premium being reallocated to other DXD holders and the treasury in the long-term it would probably result in less product funding than OP proposes (because it increases the DXD price which makes more people redeem etc.). DXD holders are also guaranteed to exit this way. Ngl, I currently have very low hope of my DXD still being redeemable in 3 years either because the treasury is drained or because the redemption will be halted to pay for salaries.

If I understand correctly, this proposal also doesn’t fire anyone? It just allocates the treasury to the product teams listed, who are then able to hire who they want?

Genuinely curious to hear what the community thinks?


My 2 cents here:

Static redemptions are interesting and deserve some discussion

The idea of a static redemption is not a terrible one, and something I have pondered a bit in the past few weeks. If the main concern around redemptions is a a spiral to exit, then a fixed period where anyone can redeem at the same rate is one way to mitigate that risk. At the end of the redemption period it is very clear who is left and how much money is left and the DAO can organize and manage expenses accordingly. Whether this is actually a problem in real life is up for debate and should be debated!

The DAO Monetary policy is evolving

All of the processes around the monetary policy and token model have been fully transparent and done with significant input from the community. The work in ongoing and everyone involved is incredibly open to ideas and concerns about the policies. I encourage you to actually engage with the people doing this work instead of throwing grenades over the wall.

It can be made better and we want to make it better. For example, I am of the opinion that the way vested DXD is treated in the current NAV calculations is flawed and it should be counted immediately in circulating supply upon issuance (not upon vesting). The token vesting would remain, meaning contributors couldn’t sell or redeem immediately, but this DXD would count toward how much others can redeem for. I will be discussing this more in the Monetary Policy Meeting on Thursday as well as laying out some options for how it could be rolled out.

This proposal is confusing

In the context of this post, I am confused about whether or not the DAO and DXD would exist at the end? There are multiple references to sunsetting DXD and DXdao, but also states that any funds left in the redemption contract after a year could be claimed by the DAO, which I assume means REP holders. So would the unclaimed funds then be held free and clear by REP holders? If all DXD vests then that means REP holders who have earned their DXD can claim against it and then at the end of the year also have access to any unclaimed funds? So it’s just getting rid of DXD but the DAO remains?

Now lets get to by far the most problematic element of this proposal:

This is just picking winners and losers from what seems like some personal grievance. Why isn’t DAVI/DXgov on this list? Carrot, a product that has been in alpha for at least a year, is considered equal in value to Swapr? Just give the ENS tokens to Nimi?

How any funds are allocated is a difficult and political question, which is the entire point of having a DAO and governance process. The rationale for this change is to keep building without “bureaucratic overhead” and give the money to project teams that have gotten things done. But I fail to see how bureacratic overhead has stopped Carrot from being shipped, or Swapr from finding product market fit.

Blaming the bureaucrats

I think everyone needs to take a long look in the mirror and realize that building defi/web3 products is difficult, building an organization that is run in a truly decentralized manner is difficult, and trying to do both at the same time is extra difficult. There isn’t one person or group to blame for things being slow, and “getting rid of the managers” isn’t going to solve the problem.

All the teams working on different products and in different guilds have a ton of autonomy. There are no bureaucrats or bosses telling them they can’t do something. But they do have to convince REP holders that they deserve the money that they are asking for. Anyone complaining that they are being strangled by bureaucratic overhead is just making excuses. If they don’t want to work in a DAO then maybe they should go work elsewhere.

DXD in governance

Finally, this proposal makes no sense if the DAO is going to continue and use Holographic consensus as it is finally getting to the point where it can use DXD as the staking token (gov 1.5), which is a HUGE change to how things work. It gives DXD holders significantly more power to veto proposals by downstaking them. Personally I am not a fan of the prediction market side of holographic consensus, but I love the ability for DXD to dictate quorum requirements. This, even before factoring in gov 2.0 will change the dynamics of DAO decision making considerably and this proposal doesn’t take any of that into account.

I find this proposal very reasonable: it’s the middle ground among a few past proposals.

There is nothing wrong with picking potential winners. DAVI’s existence relies on DXdao’s premise to enable community freedom. Without DXdao, there is no value in funding DXgov.

In wrt Carrot, the team is great and will ship. On valuations, Swapr’s FDV is just shy of $10m and has a claim on ~$0.5m in $ARB tokens at current prices. Not a bad place to be at. This proposal also gives more independence to Swapr and Carrot as suggested in the past.

Current DXdao contributors will get decent severance(?) pay in their DXD value. Between realizing the value of vested DXD now against 3 years, we know the obvious answer.

Nimi has been incredibly aligned with the ENS vision, and it is fair to allocate those tokens for Nimi.

The sheer amount of DXD redeemed tells a different story. The largest DXD holders pushed for the current DXD model to exit DXdao. And a gentle reminder that DXdao has been stalling on shipping Gov 2.0 since February 2021.


This is an elegant proposal that would prevent a death spiral and handle DXD redemptions in an orderly way while protecting DXdao products that have a user base. There seems to be a lot of malaise and lack of motivation amongst DXdao contributors these days ( several current contributors have given me feedback to this effect ) and I think this will go a long way towards fixing incentives by empowering DXdao’s squads that have live products to direct what remains of DXdao’s spending power in the most effective way, and allowing those squads to reward those who contribute the most towards their success.

I support this proposal, but would suggest the following modifications:

  • Set DXD redemption price at the redemption price under the current model at the future snapshot date

  • Add some consideration for the REP holders who would have received DXD under the Governance 2.0 proposal, and have been disappointed by the lack of progress towards Governance 2.0.

  • Have a claim period for the redemption smart contract, after which unclaimed funds will go to Swapr and Carrot treasuries.


Happy to clear up your confusion: No.

Thanks for feedback. This should be redirected to products or donated to EF.

Because they are building infrastructure for DXdao. If there is no DXdao there is no need for DXvote / DAVI. DXgov nevertheless will have a great opportunity, not only have they been funded with significant $$$ and resources, but the team will be able to fundraise if the market sees value in their product.

Have you seen governance participation? Most contributors are just collecting pay-checks and letting the power hungry push through their agenda.

I believe you’re being paid through DXdao funds? Could you drop a link to your worker proposal?


Proposal V2

This proposal includes:

  • Discontinuing DXD redemptions
  • Discontinuing DXD issuance
  • Discontinuing REP issuance
  • Accelerating vesting DXD
  • Implementing a fixed DXD claim process against 80% of the treasury, excluding DXD, SWPR, ENS, and ARB
  • Distributing 8% of the treasury, excluding DXD, SWPR, ENS, and ARB, to REP holders that would have received the 8000 DXD under the Governance 2.0 Proposal
  • Distributing ENS tokens to Nimi treasury
  • Distributing SWPR tokens to Swapr treasury
  • Distributing ARB airdrop tokens to Swapr treasury
  • Distributing 6% of treasury, excluding DXD, SWPR, ENS, and ARB, to Swapr treasury
  • Distributing 6% of treasury, excluding DXD, SWPR, ENS, and ARB, to Carrot treasury

The existing redemption system is a gradually worsening downward spiral, eventually forcing REP holders to choose between honoring redemptions or paying themselves.

This proposal sunsets DXD at a fixed 80% of treasury NAV (-DXD -SWPR -ENS -ARB), for this a snapshot will be taken on the 1st of April 00:00:00 UTC. The amounts of ETH and other tokens representing 80% of the treasury on the snapshot date will be set aside and converted to ETH. Using this amount of ETH and the outstanding DXD supply, a fixed ETH/DXD rate will be determined and a smart contract will be deployed to facility redemption. The outstanding DXD supply includes any DXD issued to contributors up until the snapshot date, with all such DXD vesting immediately. After one year, any unclaimed funds will be split evenly between the Swapr and Carrot treasuries.

The current redemption rate is 70%. This proposal makes a couple of changes to the NAV per DXD calculation. The first change is removing SWPR and ENS completely from the calculation. The second change is accelerating all contributor vesting immediately. To balance out these changes, this proposal also increases the redemption rate to 80%.

This proposal sunsets the DXdao treasury the DXD token and redirects the remaining assets to the product teams. Product teams will have the freedom to utilize the funds as they deem appropriate, with no obligations to DXdao. Yet, the funds shall be used to further product development, and not for other purposes.

The Governance 2.0 proposal promised eligible REP addresses 8000 DXD. As consideration for the lack of delivery on Governance 2.0, this proposal allocates 8% of the remaining treasury, excluding DXD, SWPR, ENS, and ARB, to this REP. This is a rough estimate of the percentage of the DXD supply that 8000 DXD would have represented if DXdao had delivered, about 14%, reduced to 8% since a large portion of REP does not meet the eligibility criteria.


This would leave the voice, operations and dxgov team without funds, which as far as I understand it would be like firing them.

I think the current contributors would prefer to continue working on DXdao and receive the vested DXD in due time. But I guess we will see when they vote on this proposal.

Yes, they are paid by dxdao, that’s why they create proposals to receive money from it. It is not just what happens on chain, we are still ongoing a restructuring process that you are proposing to shut down before we even do the first iteration.

I don’t know you, or maybe I do, and despite I agree with some of the items you presented I won’t support a proposal of this magnitude created by an anonymous person or group, a significant final initiative like this needs someone behind, even more, if it is going to be this controversial. I might even consider it a bit if I see the real person or group of people that are presenting this to start a proper discussion.

On a personal side, I find it cowardly to present this proposal anonymously, looks like you are very well informed on how dxdao works.


Products need marketing and community outreach. This proposal channels the focus from DXdao to products. Swapr and Carrot can decide who to retain from the mentioned squads should the need arise.

Layoffs happen everywhere, why should DXdao be an exception?


The long-term upside for contributors is CAPPED because (1) DXD redemptions decrease NAV and (2) product funding and salaries also burn the NAV. You can either get your salaries in stables for ~3 years and write off DXD — refer to (1) and (2). Or, realize approx. three years’ worth of stablecoin salary as severance pay today — backed by your vested or pending-to-vest DXD.

It’s a slow death spiral no matter how you interpret it.

The first thread about restructuring the DAO surfaced in late August last year, what has changed since then?


Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society. Anonymity | Electronic Frontier Foundation

This proposal just reallocates the funds to the products directly - surely these will require marketing / ops / hr etc.? Unless you’re implying these are currently valueless at DXdao? But yes, it would be totally up to the products who to hire.

I am not quite sure you have a firm grasp of the implications of the current redemption system if you suggest contributors should receive both their salary and their vested DXD. I am sure this will be sad news for most contributors, but DXdao does not have the ability to print money out of thin air.


this proposal has moved forward as a signal vote and therefore deserves a complete response.

First off, who am I?

I am a long time DXD holder with approximately 7% of my non-stable crypto portfolio in DXD. I purchased in the bonding curve and after and have not sold since. I spent 2 years working at yam.finance, mainly in operations and governance, which is currently going through a redemption. During that time I participated on and off in DXdao conversations, and have been working for @powers / caneyfork for the last 4 months, mainly helping him with DXdao related operations work such as the Monetary Policy Committee and the development of the budgeting process. He is paying me directly, so no, I am not paid by DXdao, although I plan to apply to join the operations guild in H2-2023.

Who are they?

For those who are not deep in DXdao happenings, it may be unclear who @killswitch is. To those who are, it is very clearly @JohnKelleher and/or a group closely aligned with him. A quick background: John was removed from a position of power (CTO-ish) in DXdao last summer for underperformance and has seemingly held a grudge ever since. @dlabs (dave) and @adamazad (adam) are both members of 3AC and Nimi and recently stopped working for DXdao.

The Proposal

Lets start by dissecting the proposal points:

  • Discontinue DXD issuance and redemptions:
    If there is going to be a fixed redemption then this is reasonable. But there is no timeframe stated here. Should we assume that it is immediate from passing of the signal proposal? If so, then no DXD can be paid for work to implement the redemption process (it’s a detail but worth noting).
  • Discontinue REP issuance:
    Starting when? I am going to assume that REP that has already been earned can still be issued. Anything else would deny voting power to those who earned it. Furthermore, a vote of this magnitude should probably be delayed so that contributors who have not synced their REP can do so and fully participate.
  • Accelerate contributor DXD vesting and implement a fixed duration claim at 80%. SWPR, ENS, ARB are not included in the NAV calculation
    • 8% goes to REP holders:
      This is absurd. First of all, the DXD to REP holders was contingent upon the implementation of Gov 2.0, which this proposal prevents. REP holders are not “owed” this DXD to claim the treasury. This DXD was part of a deal in return for REP voting power to DXD holders, which has not occurred and so the DXD should not be issued either. Secondly, This provision would be a windfall for the supporters of this proposal who currently hold very little DXD but lots of REP.
    • ENS (~600k worth) goes to Nimi:
      This is also absurd. DXdao gave Nimi an incubation grant worth $100k and funded 6 months of work on Nimi (worth approx. $72k) in return for 10% equity. Nimi then tried to reneg on that deal and have since posted no updates on progress. Both Adam and Dave are founders of Nimi and have publicly supported this proposal, which is unsurprising considering it commits to pay them over $600k with absolutely no strings attached. I hope Nimi is successful, but as a DXD holder, if I am being forced to give away assets in the treasury, I at least want to get something for them. In this case I get nothing.
    • DXdao SWPR tokens go to Swapr Treasury:
      This is yet another terrible deal for DXD holders. Part of the value proposition of DXD is the upside of Swapr. If I am now being forced to redeem then I am losing that upside. The SWPR tokens in the treasury belong to DXdao, and by proxy DXD holders and they should be distributed pro-rata to DXD holders before any redemption.
    • Arb tokens to Swapr Treasury:
      No opinion here as the status of where these are to be sent is unclear and if DXD holders get the SWPR then the ARB value exists via proxy.
    • Distribute 6% (-$1.5M) of DXdao Treasury to Swapr Treasury:
      First off, what Swapr Treasury? Is this money going to be controlled by the Swapr Guild or by some yet-undeployed governance process? I don’t have a problem with setting Swapr (and Carrot) free as it’s been discussed for ages, but what exactly is being voted for here? Where are these funds going and who controls them? What plans are in place for SWPR token holders to benefit from this move?
    • Distribute 6% (-$1.5M) of DXdao Treasury to Carrot Treasury:
      My comments are the same as with Swapr. Where is the money going and how is it managed? Will there be a DAO or is this money just going to a multi-sig or guild wallet with no strings attached? Does carrot deserve 1.5M in funding even though it has not proven any traction and doesn’t even have a working beta out? I guess that’s up to REP voters to decide.
    • Distribute 0% (~$0) of DXdao terasury to DXgov treasury:
      The fact that this proposal completely stiffs DXgov is galling. The responses above show a clear lack of understanding of what DAVI is (it is not purely DXdao focused) and is a slap in the face to everyone who has worked on DXdao governance. If I were rebuilding DXdao from scratch right now I would build around DAVI over Swapr and Carrot in a heartbeat. Arguments that they could go “raise money” could be equally applied to Swapr and Carrot, falling apart at the hint of interrogation.
  • Everyone not in Swapr and Carrot guilds gets fired.
    There is barely any logic to picking one group over another and something tells me that there are some long-standing grudges being played out here. Your vendetta is not worth fucking up other people’s lives and I find it pretty distasteful.

It is not lost on me that this proposal to shut down DXdao is coming from jilted contributors who have either been kicked out or left, and now stand to gain a serious windfall in treasury assets and accelerated DXD vesting if it passes.

Redemption Dynamics

Lets talk about redemption dynamics a bit because the supporters of this proposal bring them up multiple times in making claims that there will be a death spiral and that contributor DXD will be worthless by the time it has vested.

Both of these claims are built on assumptions that there will be a continuous flow of redemptions and point to the large redemptions of the last few months as an indicator of this. While I cannot project future redemptions, the large redemptions in the last few months should not be extrapolated into the future. Before January of this year, there was almost no liquidity for large DXD holders to exit their positions. Furthermore, they knew that the price would rise to close to 70% of NAV, so it didn’t make sense to exit until now. Large holders who have been sitting on their hands for years are finally able to sell and some are doing so. That is not a sign of imminent collapse, it is a pressure release before moving to a governance model where those same holders will have a say in governance. Trapped whales don’t make good governance decisions.

But lets say people do continue selling and redeeming. Is this bad? If you expect that the DAO will continue paying contributors the same when the treasury has $5M in it as when it has $25M, and there is no revenue, then it makes sense that DXD holders will exit. That is the point! It is a forcing function on contributor spending and focus. The market sets a value on the DAO via the size of the treasury. Contributors must react to that signal and adapt to keep their funding. Like any speculative enterprise, it is up to contributors to find an equilibrium between those who believe in the project and continue to fund it and those who want to exit. All redemption does is create a more liquid market.

The fact that the redemption rate is below 100% slows down redemptions by rewarding those who remain. True believers see the most upside and the most downside. DXD holders are free to express their level of belief however they choose by staying or redeeming.

DXD Holder Choice

This proposal is a curtailment of the rights of DXD holders by REP holders. In a continuous redemption like the one currently implemented, or a fixed redemption where the DAO continues to exist afterward, DXD holders have a choice. They can redeem (right to exit) or they can continue to hold with the hope of additional upside or to get a better deal later (right to stay). But if the DAO is fully shut down and all unclaimed funds are redistributed, then in order to not lose the value of their DXD, holders must redeem. This choice has been taken from them without giving them any say in its revocation.

There is clearly a large contingent of DXdao contributors (REP holders) and DXD holders who DO want the DAO to exist. They want to maintain this choice and exercise their right to stay. This choice could be trivially maintained by simply not shutting the DAO down after the redemption. Any unclaimed funds would continue to be managed by the REP and DXD holders who choose not to exit. While there are many things I would change about this proposal, this is perhaps the most important. Your money grab should not impinge upon my rights as a DXD holder.


cope seethe dilate bruv.


This proposal is now posted and boosted on Alchemy with 329k GEN upstake.

PS, I have the highest stake of 80k GEN.


The proposal is not irrational, I understand and accept that dxdao might reach a point where we will have to “cut our losses” But IMO we are far from that point. I would be willing to start considering this at the end of this year after an extensive review of our situation with the help of external people.

My reasons for downvoting the proposal are:
The proposer of the proposal acting cowardly cause there is no person or group of persons owning the proposal submission and I think It is important to know who is proposing this to understand their motives and if we can reach a better solution.
Regarding the previous contributors that support this proposal being submitted and passed in such a rush manner, I find that vindictive and unethical by not honoring their previous worker agreement where the vested DXD was a reward that all contributors accepted knowing the risks and no since they are not contributors anymore they are using their earned REP to receive a vested payment on advance.

I would propose postponing this proposal to be revisited in Q4 2023 (in seven months) after an internal and external review of the first 10 months of the new squad structure we just started using this year.

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If not mistaken, DXdao first had a major restructuring in October 2021 by doubling down on Swapr, inception, and formalizing DXgov to work on Guilds and Gov 2.0, and Carrot slowly came into existence. That did not pan well and then another effort in July 2022 was discussed. Then a set of three-phase restructure started in Q3 and was heavily discussed during the DXretreat 2022. You are suggesting waiting another six months until October 2023?

Following your logic, DXdao will be undergoing restructuring into perpetuity.


You are not mistaken, and following my logic we would have time to test the structure that took too much time to apply, just that, in case we want to close the dao most the actions propose makes sense.

Following your work ethics (which I despise), two months ago you were a contributor and being paid by dxdao and now you want to close everything to get instant access to the vested DXD that I think you never claimed, dxdao would be done.

In the past weeks contributors have been trying to contact you with no success just to ask you simple questions about work you did and you disappeared, but you seem to be very active here proposing to close everything down just to get more money, disgusting.

which interests are you defending here? yours? or the dao?

At the time at which the proposal passes. A part of contributing to DXdao is foreseeing governance — 5% of your time commitment is to governance. This includes but is not limited to:

  • Submit proposals in a timely matter.
  • Keeping your REP in sync.
  • Participating in governance: voicing concerns, holding others accountable, and being a good steward.

Law Smart contracts do not protect the ignorant.

You are not entirely wrong. But what do you know? Working for DXdao (and vesting DXD) or holding DXD wasn’t without risk.

I appreciate your wishes for Nimi to succeed. Who did mention anything about $600k? Nimi plans to use the ENS to participate in ENS DAO. As a DXD holder, you get something, see my next comment:

What’s the bullish case for DAVI? A veToken knockoff formula took 2 years to be shipped. Why? How does DAVI compete with veterans from Aragon building Firm.

This is called trimming down the fat; a business term. I do not want to rehash my thoughts on layoffs; they are sad and painful. Nonetheless, in DXdao’s case, DXD holders get a good guaranteed severance pay TODAY.

Finally, DXdao is not a charity to sponsor certain individuals’ lifestyle choices.

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My email is adam@adamazad.com. My Twitter is @adamzazad. I’ve answered every question relayed to me whether via Signal, email, or otherwise.

If you are referring to Keybase, I don’t actively use it anymore. What other communications mediums have you tried before coming to this conclusion?

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As soon as funds are liquidated.

Think the proposal text is pretty clear? In case you need some help:

Rossy ross, do you want to give us a full list of proposal which are not valid because when they passed there wasn’t a proper rep sync done? (i.e. all proposals since we have GC?) Or just the ones you don’t agree with?

This draft was on the forum for 7 weeks a number of rep syncs were done in that period and passed. Anyone could have rep synced, but they simply didn’t care?

Rep holders should be aware of the Importance of Tidy Rep

Nothing stopping them from redeeming their DXD and forming DXdao 2.0 with those funds!

The proposal was on the forum for 7 days, people just ignored it. Could have made some arguments for changes or amendments in fact some were made based on comments in this thread.

This proposal has followed all the regular governance steps, it’s fine to admit you just don’t like the proposal, but no need to lie about it being rushed or not following DXdao procedures.

Also the proposal could have been downstaked - but guess contributors don’t care enough about DXdao to buy $20 worth of GEN to downstake it?