Today’s governance call spent a significant amount of time discussing the importance of assigning some voting rights to DXD holders.
Consensus seems to firmly favor the idea that DXD holders should have some claim to voting rights, and discussion now revolves around the best way to do it. Aspects to think about include:
The timeliness of different proposals
Proper voting weight per holder/DXD
How to assess the DXD community at large
Whether or not vetting should take place to
I’ve personally advocated for an airdrop of REP to all addresses that hold DXD as an immediate, interim solution until more formal measures are put in place. We can blacklist contract addresses so Uniswap pools don’t get REP. Some projects use a claims interface where users withdraw the airdrop to their address. The dao could employ something similar so that DXD holders with no interest in governance won’t waste the several dollars worth of gas to retrieve a non-transferable token.
From there, more permanent solutions on the table include a bulk REP vote for DXD, where holders would vote among themselves then deliver that one large vote to the DAO. The idea of child DAOs or “guilds” was also discussed, where DXD holders would participate in a specific DXD subDAO pertaining to DXD affairs as well as having governance say in the DXdao “mother DAO”.
There’s also an idea of staking or locking DXD for votes. The philosophy behind a locking mechanism (as I understand) is to filter for long term holders who are seen as better suited for participation in governance.
From here, discussion needs to determine whether or not an airdrop is appropriate as an interrim solution, and if so, what that REP per DXD ratio should look like and a snapshot date to shoot for. Again, I am of the opinion that something immediate like an airdrop absolutely is the proper course of actions while something more permanent is discussed. Given the current market climate, I think we’re racing against the clock to get DXD holders formally involved to help maximize growth during the bull market in progress for the next x weeks (or months, hopefully).
Beyond that, what’s the best long-term solution for incorporating DXD holders into the dao’s governance?
Agree with assigning some voting rights to DXD holders,and i know some rep holder really dont care about voting and dxdao’s development,they do nothing,like Loopring team.
What’s the overlap between DXD and REP holder? I thought that 70%ish percent of REP are owned by one wallet. So that leaves the 930 DXD holder with what share of the REPs? - Is it meaningful enough to care?
Will REP remain non-fungible?
Staking of DXD seems like a proper solution (many other projects do it this way).
Having a quick fix now only to change it all again in 3 months won’t help imo. The current DXD-REP structure is so hairy, ideally there’s one action that cleans it up. Or else you compound the complexities.
Need send DXD to REP and delete this REP forever. In future, community will vote with 0x addresses.
Dxdao will calculate amount of DXD on each 0x address for fair voting power and for fair revenue distribution.
This will drive value for all Dxdao, this will attract huge investors and new community members as DXD model and value will be understandably.
Liquidity providers will be stimulated to hold, investors to invest and earlier contributors (rep) to contribute as they contributed before, plus who will contribute in future, will be rewarded with more DXD.
More you care about Dxdao future, more Initiatives you will have to hold more DXD.
There are a few options to allow DXD holders to receive reputation in the DXdao.
Reputation from token scheme This is a sort of an opt-in Airdrop of Reputation to DXD Holders - Allowing every DXD token holder to redeem reputation pro rata to their holding, given a block number for snapshot. This scheme will allow DXD holders to become DAO members, but its a “One time thing” and incentivizes buying the token before the snapshot and selling it afterwards.
Continuous locking for reputation: This scheme will allow the locking of the DXD token in order to receive reputation. It is currently being used by NecDAO where by locking the Nectar token for a period of time (Ned is earned from trading on the platform) one can receive reputation in the DAO.
This scheme is highly configurable: from amount of rep gained, intervals, and locking periods.
When locking, a user will indicate the number of periods (N) he is willing to lock his tokens. Reputation in each period is divided pro rata to a score (N Remaining periods * Number of tokens)
These are some of the options, but these schemes should be configured very carefully as it raises questions about plutocracy if you can “buy” voting power in the DAO.
Buying DXD you belive and invest in Dxdao ecosystem and products.
Have a look at Binance. There is no some rep, and they do have strong community and billions in market cap. Because community know what is bnb and there is no any other token and will be not any other for all products, for all ieo’s. Only new use cases can be added to bnb, to support bnb value and holders. Same with all top projects.
I do not know any top project who succeed with dual token model. All project who have 2 “tokens” for different purposes are below 50 m market cap and lowest support from community.
Example: To have a vote in Dxdao you will need to hold DXD for 1 month min at your 0x address.
But to send dxd for a hold to get a vote, people will feel unsecure.
Rep - it is a big wall for new investment flow to Dxdao and new memebers, because there is no clear why DXD is a native token of Dxdao and you do not have vote, you do not have revenue (at list now).
Native == MAIN.
We need to take a lessons from a top projects, how to build wealth and community around project and not from Nec, This is not good example.
I hope our new member PeteSmeet understand and support my opinion and will open DXD for new investments and supporters.
It’s not really a dual-token model. You can’t transfer or liquidate your REP. The distinction here is that good behavior in the DAO can be rewarded with REP- that’s a good thing to have. If it’s solely by DXD holdings, we’ll have to provide additional financial allocations for “good work”.
I’ll reiterate that I think the opt-in airdrop is a good model in that it’s easy to deploy and and DXD holders will be able to vote ASAP. I think it’s a given that DXD holders will have voting rights in the future but we want to capitalize on the current state of the market and getting the DXD community more formally involved as soon as possible is a great way to do that.
If needed to choose from this 2 options i will vote for 1.
If people will know that DXD is for revenue and need to hold for example 2-6 month to get share of fees no one will sell it afterwards. But i do not get why we need Airdrop of reputation in face of erc-20 if we can calculate DXD on balances and do not build so complicated sheme where we blur DXD value and not adding.
The DXD earning a share of the fees is independent of the voting power.
What this thread is about is the distribution of Reputation, or voting power in the DAO, to DXD holders, aka investors, and whats the best way to do that.
The reason for this is that certain DXD holders want to participate in the governance.
Dxdao will calculate amount of DXD on each 0x address for fair voting power and for fair revenue distribution.
More you care about Dxdao future, more Initiatives you will have to hold more DXD.
Simple, Elegant, Fair and Clean resolution.
