45 Days full-time (40hs/week) engagement from github:AugustoL (Senior Full Stack JS Dev) at 3000 USD/Month salary.
45 Days full-time (40hs/week) engagement from LevelK (Senior Full Stack JS Dev) at 3000 USD/Month salary.
45 Days full-time (40hs/week) engagement from corkus (Product Manager, UI/UX Designer) at 3000 USD/Month salary.
New developer fund (to be used only to on-board new developers) at 1500 USD/Month.
10050 REP (1% Rep issuance at 15/05/20) to github:AugustoL.
10050 REP (1% Rep issuance at 15/05/20) to LevelK.
10050 REP (1% Rep issuance at 15/05/20) to new developers.
155 DXD* vesting for 1 year with a 6 month cliff for corkus in lieu of receiving Reputation.
The salary was calculated based on the current salary on the market and available funds in the DXdao. The salaries are below market rate because the team is committed to the DXdao’s success and believes it is important to spend our limited funds in a responsible manner. For reference:
Total: 30150 REP, 155 DXD and 15750 USD (paid in ETH, using market price at time of payment)
50% of the USD payment from the full-time agreements to be sent upfront in this proposal In ETH (6750 USD), it will be distributed internally between the three developers in a gnosis safe under their control.
50% of the USD payment from full-time agreements to be sent at the time the work agreement finishes in ETH (6750 USD), which means that the payment proposal will be created a week in advance (24/06/20).
2% Reputation distribution to be done directly in separated proposals (1% each) to github:AugustoL and Levelk, to be sent at the time the work agreement finishes, which means that the REP issuance proposal will be created a week in advance (24/07/20).
New developer fund ETH and REP will be distributed through one or more proposals submitted with cryptographic signatures of github:AugustoL, LevelK and corkus.
New Developer Fund
The developer fund for this proposal will be 2250 USD and 1% REP that would be claimable only by users who can verify the github account ownership used for their collaboration and they will have to provide cryptographic signatures that corroborate the collaboration from Levelk, corkus and github:AugustoL.
Interested developers should join the #development chat room in our keybase community, introduce themselves and communicate on what they will be working on. The goal here is to on board new developers to the community to help the DXdao deliver better quality products and have more developers involved for future projects and products maintenance.
*REP to DXD conversion calculation:
1% Rep valued at 2500$
$2500 / $199,65 per ETH = 12.52128618652 ETH
Average DXD price calculated by fundraiser application price 0.1621 / 2 = 0.08105 DXD/ETH
12.52128618652 / 0.08105 = 154.48841686021 = ~155 DXD
Really cohesive proposal — I’ve loved the pioneering work thus far and this is another bold step for our sovereign collective.
I want to point out an accounting issue: it does not seem logical to value REP/DXD as no market exists that supports this conversion. Yet, I believe we can resolve this issue. In your calculations, you state that:
$2500 ≈ 12.52≡ ≈ 155 DXD
What you leave out is the first assumption, that is:
1% REP (10544.31) ≈ $2500 ≈ 12.52≡ ≈ 155 DXD
One of the benefits of having a DXD → REP locking mechanism is it allows us to approximate this sort of market (with a very controlled oversight). We could code in our locking contract, for instance, that:
155 DXD locked x period → 1% REP
Now as for period x, what should it be? You provide the answer to this as well:
1 year with a 6 month cliff
Equivalently, we could say that period x is 1.5 years, but DXD may be unlocked after 1 year.
The big takeaway here I’m making is that DXD/REP conversions absent a DXD → REP locking mechanism are unwieldy. But once we introduce the mechanism, we have a yardstick for measurement: one that’s rather elegant, in my opinion. I hope the collective appreciates my line of argumentation here, and how can create consistency in DXD and REP valuations.
I like this experimentation with locking DXD (and maybe other assets) for REP and think it could be a great avenue for bringing more people to the governance table. I think balance is key. To achieve maximum decentralization, it is important for the DXdao to think carefully about how reputation is distributed. I am a little wary of allowing reputation to effectively be bought out of concern for capture. It could be pretty straightforward to prevent one address from purchasing too much control outright, but it could be much more difficult to distinguish when multiple addresses are in fact controlled by one party. Curious your thoughts on how this could be protected against.
I fixed the omission of the 1% = $2500 assumption in the conversion of REP to DXD. It was actually in the text but hidden due to a formatting issue.
Another possibility for a yardstick in valuing REP compared to DXD is to look at the amount of DXD controlled by the DXdao itself, and combine that with a projection for REP inflation. The former is a hard number, 100,000, and the latter could be discovered through consensus of the DXdao. Think of it as a valuation of the DXdao, and REP being valued for it’s proportionate stake in these assets.
Your work so far was outstanding IMO!
I liked the work proposal and think it will take the dao’s products a few steps forward.
To-Do list details
I would love to see a bit more details of what needs to be done to achieve those points and a bit more detailed time estimation. I know it’s not easy to do and I trust you guys based on your previous work. We need to remember we are setting here precedent for the dao’s governance procedures. I’m expecting more development work proposals to come in the future based on this one (at least until the dao will develop guidelines for proposals).
I know your work is visible and transparent through Github. For the less technical members, it would be awesome to include a short, high level written weekly or bi-weekly development update. This will allow everyone to follow the dev progress, set expectations for delays/timelines and allow the broader community to be involved in decision making.
I know @corkus didn’t ask for additional REP because he already controls a sizable amount. I really appreciate it and I think it is the right decision here.
It will be much appreciated to see a %REP disclosure when asking for additional REP especially when the proposal is not made by each individual developer so this information is less transparent.
This subject was discussed on keybase. I think there are fair arguments for and against using the dao’s pre minted DXD for payments. In this early stage of the fundraiser and DXD valuation, I think it deserves further discussion and thought. My personal suggestion will be to convert DXD payment to ETH payment at this point in time.
Your work and dedication is highly appreciated and invaluable to the DXdao!
Please keep up the good work!
Would love to hear your thoughts
I totally agree with Chen and want mention that from my point of view 100000 DXD is better to keep before DXdao products start generate fees. So I think it is better to offer (request) ETH or DAI bounty instead of DXD