Competition scheme Feedback and design

We’ve been working on an implementation of a Competition scheme, also known as a “top N of M” scheme. I initially talked about it in this dHack DAOtalk thread.

The Goal has been to create a scheme that is more suitable for hackathons than the current Contribution Reward. I didn’t think anything should be specifically developed for dHack and so the scheme has been designed to be generic and usable by all DAOs.

The Scheme

The main innovation here is that the scheme will add a new DAO decision mechanism. Instead of a boolean **Pass / Fail result, a two-stage system is introduced:

  1. Does the DAO want to run a competition, and does it agree to distribute X funds to N participants?
    If passed, then:

  2. Open a ‘Competition,’ wherein:

    • Any participant can submit a suggestion * Reputation holders can only upvote suggestions * And funds are distributed to the top N suggestions

In this scheme, the reward could be 0 for a social consensus competition, and N =1 for only one winner. Imagine a poll where participants each submit a suggestion to answer a subjective question, and then the DAO votes. An example question of this sort could be:: "What should we do with the Reputation cap?”, with suggestions such as:

  • “Increase to 5%”
  • “Remove completely”
  • “Continuing to discuss this is not productive”

The suggestion with the most votes would “win” this signaling competition."

After the DAO has agreed to launch it, the competition has 3 stages: \

  1. Suggestion period: Anyone can submit suggestions for the reward

  2. Voting period: The contract takes a Reputation snapshot, and voting begins. Each Reputation holder can vote ‘Y’ Times. Each vote applies their full Reputation weight

  3. Ending→ The vote is concluded when it has reached duration Z and rewards are distributed.

Example

A simple example is a Genesis logo competition, where the top three submissions (suggestions) are rewarded:

Title: Genesis Logo Competition

Description: We want a new logo and would like to run an open suggestion to decide which one is the best

Rewards: 3 ETH

Number of winning suggestions: 3

Split in % (leave empty for an equal split): 50, 30, 20

Number of times a reputation holder is allowed to vote: 2

Proposal start time: Dec 1st 2020, 10:00 AM GMT

**Voting start time **(Reputation Snapshot)t: Dec 15th, 2020, 10:00 AM GMT

Proposal end time: January 1st 2020, 2020, 10:00 AM GMT

Scheme Design

This is the Scheme’s design, as you can see the voting machine (“Top N of M”) sits outside of Arc, meaning that this scheme can be used with different voting machines. \

For example: one could replace the competition contract with an “escrow contract”. Upon the DAO’s approval 50% of the funds are allocated to the proposer, while the other 50% of the funds are locked inside an “escrow contract” until 10% of the DAO votes for their distribution (note this is an arbitrary example).

Language

This is a tricky one where I would love comments and feedback so we can send something out that has a clear language that users can understand quickly. \

Mockups

This is what the scheme will look like, there are still some differences and we’re finalizing the design in the upcoming days, but feel free to comment.
(The proposals screen is exactly the same as the proposal stage is identical to a contribution reward proposal)

  1. This is the “Open competition” and also the first page of where a user will land if when the click the Scheme from the DAO’s home page.

  2. Continued open competitions, different colors for different statuses of the Competition: Not open yet, Open for Submissions, Voting starts, and ended.

Admin note: moved to R&D.

Could this “platform” (or whatever you want to call it) be used to allow a multi-phased multi-vote proposal to come into effect?

If some rando comes in and tells GenDAO they can do “Awesome thing XYZ” for 20 ETH it would be great if there was a 2-phase “startup” and “completion” aspect rather than either
a) Telling rando to get lost, it’s too expensive and they are unknown
b) Saying yes and getting ripped off when rando underperforms or runs off

2 phase payout solves this to some degree (yes, lots of caveats and other variables that could be added). Curious if this is friendly to that scenario.

1 Like

The simple answer is yes, but just not at the moment. It will require some extra development for “Escrow Scheme”

In the current model the competition contract runs with a set of parameters and functions to find the Best N of M proposals. if you wanted to lock someone’s for a purpose like you mentioned you have no way to ensure no one else can’t make a submission and take the funds. It’s designed as an open competition and you can’t lock the funds for a specific address.

You could do:

For example: one could replace the competition contract with an “escrow contract”. Upon the DAO’s approval, N% of the funds are allocated to the proposer, while the other 100-N% of the funds are locked inside an “escrow contract” until Y% of the DAO votes for their distribution (note this is an arbitrary example).