We’ve been working on an implementation of a Competition scheme, also known as a “top N of M” scheme. I initially talked about it in this dHack DAOtalk thread.
The Goal has been to create a scheme that is more suitable for hackathons than the current Contribution Reward. I didn’t think anything should be specifically developed for dHack and so the scheme has been designed to be generic and usable by all DAOs.
The main innovation here is that the scheme will add a new DAO decision mechanism. Instead of a boolean **Pass / Fail result, a two-stage system is introduced:
Does the DAO want to run a competition, and does it agree to distribute X funds to N participants?
If passed, then:
Open a ‘Competition,’ wherein:
- Any participant can submit a suggestion * Reputation holders can only upvote suggestions * And funds are distributed to the top N suggestions
In this scheme, the reward could be 0 for a social consensus competition, and N =1 for only one winner. Imagine a poll where participants each submit a suggestion to answer a subjective question, and then the DAO votes. An example question of this sort could be:: "What should we do with the Reputation cap?”, with suggestions such as:
- “Increase to 5%”
- “Remove completely”
- “Continuing to discuss this is not productive”
The suggestion with the most votes would “win” this signaling competition."
After the DAO has agreed to launch it, the competition has 3 stages: \
Suggestion period: Anyone can submit suggestions for the reward
Voting period: The contract takes a Reputation snapshot, and voting begins. Each Reputation holder can vote ‘Y’ Times. Each vote applies their full Reputation weight
Ending→ The vote is concluded when it has reached duration Z and rewards are distributed.
A simple example is a Genesis logo competition, where the top three submissions (suggestions) are rewarded:
Title: Genesis Logo Competition
Description: We want a new logo and would like to run an open suggestion to decide which one is the best
Rewards: 3 ETH
Number of winning suggestions: 3
Split in % (leave empty for an equal split): 50, 30, 20
Number of times a reputation holder is allowed to vote: 2
Proposal start time: Dec 1st 2020, 10:00 AM GMT
**Voting start time **(Reputation Snapshot)t: Dec 15th, 2020, 10:00 AM GMT
Proposal end time: January 1st 2020, 2020, 10:00 AM GMT
This is the Scheme’s design, as you can see the voting machine (“Top N of M”) sits outside of Arc, meaning that this scheme can be used with different voting machines. \
For example: one could replace the competition contract with an “escrow contract”. Upon the DAO’s approval 50% of the funds are allocated to the proposer, while the other 50% of the funds are locked inside an “escrow contract” until 10% of the DAO votes for their distribution (note this is an arbitrary example).
This is a tricky one where I would love comments and feedback so we can send something out that has a clear language that users can understand quickly. \
This is what the scheme will look like, there are still some differences and we’re finalizing the design in the upcoming days, but feel free to comment.
(The proposals screen is exactly the same as the proposal stage is identical to a contribution reward proposal)
This is the “Open competition” and also the first page of where a user will land if when the click the Scheme from the DAO’s home page.
Continued open competitions, different colors for different statuses of the Competition: Not open yet, Open for Submissions, Voting starts, and ended.