Can we ture off the linear bonding curve?

said from Chen Magen:
“there is some reasoning for continuous setup like this.
basically every additional minted token adds eth to the treasury.
so if the project does well and generate revenue, it’ll send it to the curve increasing the buyback price and eventually “buying back” DXD when the buy price of the curve is higher that on the open market.
This way the org is continuously funded.
the problem is, if there’s enough funding for some time, it seems not so logical to keep fundraising. basically creating more token without needing more funding”
“then I though maybe we can have some rules, when the curve should be turned on or off based on the treasury.
for eg if (treasury in ) / (monthly burn in ) is less than 18
this means less that 18 month runway so maybe we should turn back on
if it’s more than 36, turn off”
said from Chris:
“It would be nice to just have a mechanism to turn the curve on and off”

IMO,the price of dxd should be up to the secondary market,the linear bonding curve is ridiculous,though i know we need continuous fundraising.

Make a proposal and defend it properly and the community will vote on it.

i only have dxd,dont have rep,cant vote

I think this is a good opportunity for those that are familiar with the bonding curve contract, and anyone involved with treasury management to weigh in on this topic.

This topic has been informally discussed on all DXdao networks. I firmly believe that there needs to be clarity with this, and not just waking up one day looking at the treasury and thinking “Boy, we have an EOS on our hands - better do something about it now!”

With projected spend rates, there should be a comfortable treasury level at which fundraising is not necessary, I am surprised that this has been left unaddressed, at least officially (unless there is some discussion about this on a call that I am unaware of).

Limiting supply of DXD and not further diluting it with continuous fundraising on top of an enormous pre-mint would give investors in DXD confidence in REP holders.


I’m not sure how much it matters (I’m sure there’s a way to hack it) but the curve uses a Fairmint-style implementation which does not have the ability to set a ceiling or a means of disabling it (unless you “buy out” the curve by paying for everybody’s tokens up until the curve price). Curve Labs was evaluating it as a potential tool for another DAO, but we backed off after looking at these implementation issues. Another option is a token swap — the DAO could install a new token minting contract and snapshot DXD at a certain block then offer a swap — but this would also be a custom scheme and require dedicated dev work.

Just offering that from the technical perspective, this isn’t as arbitrary as pulling a single lever by the DAO.

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