Again, how would you pull that off? Let’s say Uniswap has a DXD price of 0.9 and the curve has a price of 1. One buyer shows up and wants to make a yuuuge buy which, if purchased on Uniswap (case 1) will make the price jump to, say, 1.2 whereas if the purchase was done on the curve (case 2) then it would make the price jump to 1.1. I guess that’s the case you’re referring to.
First off, I’ll start by saying that to create such a price slippage, given the current size of the liquidity pool on Uniswap of roughly $300K, the investment should have to be quite sizable, which makes it quite unlikely. But ok, let’s assume it happens.
Second, it’s important to point out that, if the liquidity pool on Uniswap is large enough, the price increase caused by the purchase might actually be bigger on the curve than on uniswap.
Third, uniswap and the curve are always correlated. If the price jumps on the curve, you can expect the price on Uniswap to rally as well.
Fourth, if the price on Uniswap were to surpass the price of the curve, arbitrageurs will very quickly size the opportunity and buy on the curve to sell on Uniswap until price of Uniswap = price of the curve.
Fifth, as I mentioned in my previous comment, work can be done to blend both markets (uniswap and the curve) on a unique UI that will take care of optimizing each trade.
So, bottom line, what you want is simply put a supply cap to the number of DXD under the argument that “dxDAO has enough money now, let’s reward investors”. Well, I, for one, am totally opposed to cutting the source of funding and jeopardizing the future of the dxDAO not even 6 months after launch simply to create a short term signal so that investors can pump and dump. That’s totally not the spirit of the dxDAO. Investors that are not happy with the performance can sell at anytime, it’s fine.