A simple cryptoeconomic game could distribute the ‘track proposals and enforce accountability’ function, thereby removing the need for an Accountability Task Force and related budget, comms channels, spreadsheets, etc.
Any Genesis member (rep holders) or observer (such as predictors) submits a proposal to simultaneously:
slash the reputation of the specified offender
reward herself
This creates an ongoing incentive for anyone to hunt for undelivered proposals. If the reporter is wrong, then that evidence should come to light during the voting period and the DAO will reject the proposal.
While this is already technically possible at the protocol level, it would require minor modifications to Alchemy Earth’s Contribution Reward Queue views (the U.I. level):
“New Proposal” pop-up should allow a user to specify multiple addresses with different reward types and amounts.
Proposal Card should display the reward types and amounts for each address separately.
This post is a follow-up to a comment by @Stratis during the break-out portion of today’s Genesis call about finding simple ways to distribute the ATF’s role across the DAO.
Caveats: I still think it would be useful to have…
an Accountability working group to get this sort of game going (encourage DAOstack to add this U.I. feature, submit the first few example proposals, …)
Paid Defense Officer(s) to monitor the DAO for attacks and iterate on defense protocols.
I want to note that the above example is “proposal multi-targeting,” which is something I’ve discussed with @dragonfly at length. That is, being able to target more than one address to assign funds and Rep (contribution rewards).
I think a combination of Adjudication and Escrow contracts could do the trick nicely for ATF.
Note that Multi-Target has a lot of intersection with Escrow. They can easily be combined or chained.
There are more than one scenarios here, such as where certain rewards, such as reputation, are not distributed until the adjudication has completed favorably (Curacao). Or like Genesis, where adjudication happens after the rewards have been distributed.
I’ve been thinking about this in the context of Curacao…
I`m totally aligned with this idea of involving community into accountability issues.
My suggestion on this regard differed only in part, namely, setting an escrow to reward active community members.
Why escrow? To put a group of ATF members in charge of the process, because this process won`t run autonomously:
(1) recent low voting activity gives all grounds to forecast low accountability activity;
(2) autonomous running of this process will not guarantee implication of standard rules and practices – new DAO members ‘arrive’ every day and they yet don`t share same experiences as existing members do.
Plus we got no written rules, no place to put them and no enforcement engine to make people follow them. The only law is – the current vote, which never guarantees the next day vote gonna be on the same base.
To conclude I should say that this is a very promising idea. To let it grow up to an autonomous system, I suggest putting it under ATF temporary supervision.
Great conversation, I’m really happy to see all these ideas about how we can automate this process more (which I don’t know how to do!).
I’ve just started a new thread with a related topic, about how we would like to flag bad behavior in the GenDAO, because this has come up recently in ATF conversations: How do we want to flag negative behavior in Genesis?
One key question there is whether the element of flagging can be automated as well (and whether that makes sense or might cause even more harm).
I would love to hear your thoughts over there on this topic!
I’ve been living with someone this week (and next) from the regen network. They basically are supporting project validation, but exclusively for regenerative projects. But it is an interesting “pluggable” framework they have, so I plan to discuss with her how/whether it can be extended to any type of project, and be able to have an automated interface with our DAOs. A particular challenge is that it is not on ethereum (Cosmos), so interoperability is a question…
Hey! Circling back to this - did something emerge? There appears to be a rough spec for a feature - but with some unanswered questions…mostly from the ex ATFer @Dmitry
An escrow function is being prioritsed but will perhaps not answer all the accountability needs - has thinking evolved on the slash-rep of non-deliverers->gain it yourself idea? @dragonfly@orishim@papa_raw@eric.arsenault
We still have a strong need for accountability features built into the tool But perhaps we still need the human component to act as arbitrator?
I thought of this possible protocol function mainly based on something @alexz said in a call:
What if when submitting a financial proposal the person had to put how much of that money is absolutely necessary to start it, and the rest stayed in an escrow, together with the reputation they are asking for
So they receive a percentage of the full amount upon approval of the proposal, and the rest is locked until delivery.
To approve the delivery, there is a fastest slick tab with quicker and lower parameters like Alex mentioned in a breakout room we had.
So to approve the delivery of a proposal the main DAO page wouldn’t be clogged. We would just have to think of incentives to make people participate in the approval of delivery phase, to make as quick and easy as possible.
If the proposal was approved, then the money and rep would be released, and if delivery was failed, they wouldn’t receive the locked stuff.
sure @dragonfly ! I mean that we could have a tab in Alchemy, or another item in the menu called something like “proposal delivery approvals”. If you click in this page you see a list of proposal deliveries pending approval, something similar to a DAO, but with parameters that would make this decision very quick and optimal. Maybe people that voted for that proposal in the first stage could be notified when the delivery its up for approval, and those are the ones to be able to vote. They would receive incentives similar to voting in an “early stage proposal”. So people would have a double incentive to vote in the first place, even if a proposal is already boosted.
But perhaps we still need the human component to act as arbitrator?